

JPRS 80007

2 February 1982

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1215

Selections from Soviet Foreign Policy Journals



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

2 February 1982

USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
No. 1215

SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

CONTENTS

Table of Contents of Journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 5, 1981).....	1
Third World Social Progress Criteria Suggested (Viktor Leonidovich Sheynis; NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 5, 1981).....	2
Leaders of Third World Independence Movements Portrayed (A. V. Gordon; NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 5, 1981).....	21
Prospects for U.S. Relations With OAS Members Discussed (B. F. Martynov; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 11, Nov 81).....	29
Mikoyan Attacks U.S. Terrorism in Latin America (S. A. Mikoyan; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 10, Oct 81).....	42
Tajik Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies Described (D. S. Saidmuradov; NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 5, 1981).....	46

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF JOURNAL 'NARODY AZII I AFRIKI'

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, 1981 p 254

[Text] Articles. Sh. G. Nadirov. Along the Path of Socialist Construction. V. S. Baskin. Technical Aid of Capitalist States to African Countries. Ye. A. Glushchenko. British Colonizing Practice in Nigeria. V. I. Kornev. Buddhism and Society in Thailand. V. L. Sheinis. On Criteria of Social Progress in Developing Countries. Problems of Methodology. A. I. Pershits. The Dynamics of Traditions and Possibilities of Their Interpretation as a Source.

Notes. V. A. Gantsky. Problems of Minerals Processing in Developing Countries. Yu. N. Vinokurov. The Rebel Movement of 1962-1965 in Congo. M. S. Kameneva. The Policy of Islamization in Iran and Its Linguistic Consequences. M. Yu. Kim. China and Pablo Neruda.

Original Publications. The Hymns to Skambha in the Atharvaveda. Introduction, Translation and Commentary by T. Ya. Yelizarenkova.

Conferences and News. D. S. Saidmuradov (Dushanbe). Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. O. A. Kolobov (Gorky). US National Archives' Collection of Documents on the History of the Near East of Modern and Contemporary Time. Ye. D. Ogneva, I. V. Morozova. Collection of Books in Tibetan Language in the Lenin State Library of the USSR. A. G. Podolsky. Study of Buddhist Memorials of the Kara Tepe Mound in old Termez. Chronical Notes.

Critique and Bibliography. Review Articles. V. Ya. Belokrenitsky. Socio-Economic Development of Pakistan. N.G. Khmelyova. Algeria's Struggle for Independence in the 19th Century and its Reflection in the French Bourgeois Historiography. A.M. Samozvantsev. The Problem of the Ancient and Medieval India's Society in the Indian Studies of the German Democratic Republic and Poland. Reviews. V.A. Gordon. R. A. Ulyanovsky. Political Portraits of Champions of National Independence (in Russian). Yu.G. Aleksandrov. B.I. Slavny. Employment Problem in Developing Countries. A Critical Analysis of Theories and Methods of Investigation (in Russian). V.I. Maksimenko, Yu. V. Chudodeyev. V.M. Mazurov. USA--China--Japan: Restructuring of Interstate Relations (1969-1979) (in Russian). A.G. Belsky. Bohuslav Doubrava. Imperialismus a rovojove zeme. L.A. Lelekov. M.A. Dandamayev, V.G. Lukonin. Culture and Economy of Ancient Iran (In Russian). S.D. Serebryany. Buddhism and Medieval Culture of the Central Asian Peoples (in Russian). V.G. Khoros. P.Ye. Ollawa. Participatory Democracy in Zambia. The Political Economy of National Development. Book Notes. List of Main Works of Sh.M. Shamukhamedov Dr. Sc. (Phil.).

In memoriam of M.E. Schneider. In Memoriam of I.S. Katznelson. In Reply to Our Articles. Contributors.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1981

THIRD WORLD SOCIAL PROGRESS CRITERIA SUGGESTED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, 1981 pp 63-80

[Article by Viktor Leonidovich Sheynis, candidate of economic sciences, research fellow at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations and specialist on general questions of the contemporary development of Asian, African and Latin American countries: "Criteria of Social Progress in the Developing Countries"*)]

[Text] The "social development" and "social progress" concepts are often taken to be synonymous. Such use of the terms has a point inasmuch as movement from lower to higher social structures and relations defines the most general direction of historical development. But identification of these concepts is not always correct.

Social movement or development does not amount to progress. "In spite of the claims to 'progress,' instances of regression and circular motion are to be observed constantly," K. Marx and F. Engels objected to Bruno Bauer.¹ The problem of the delimitation of these concepts arises each time it is a question not of social development in general but of development within the bounds of some social sphere and social community and some historical period or other. This delimitation assumes a far from abstract nature when it is a question of such a complex, contradictory and far from settled complex of social phenomena as the reality of the developing world of recent decades. In this case it is essential to "adapt" general sociological criteria to a specific social context lacking historical analogies. The criteria which we present for the reader's judgment are based to an equal extent both on an analysis of social development in Asian, African and Latin American countries in all its distinctiveness and inevitability and on a historical-materialist vision of world social development as a whole (particularly in class-antagonistic societies). They should reflect the general and the particular in the paths and forms of social progress.

In defining our own viewpoint on a question which has given rise to lively debate among scholars we proceed from the notion of man as the end in itself of historical development--a notion which is at the basis of the scientific and ethical standpoint of the classical authors of Marxism. "What is wealth other than the universality of the requirements, capabilities, means of consumption, production forces and

*Published for the purpose of discussion.

so forth of individuals created by universal exchange?" K. Marx asked. "What is wealth other than the complete development of man's domination of the forces of nature, that is, both of the forces of so-called 'nature' and the forces of his own nature. What is wealth other than the absolute discovery of man's creative gifts without any preconditions other than preceding historical development which makes an end in itself of this integrity of development, that is, the development of all human forces as such, irrespective of any predetermined scale whatever."²

The scientific tradition of this approach goes back to the luminaries of the 18th century and to Hegel. But, as distinct from them, Marxism stresses the antagonistic nature of development in presocialist formations. First, the transition from one historical stage to another was frequently connected with the loss of important characteristics and possibilities of the development of both the individual and large social groups, classes and strata. Second, and this is the main point, progress taken from the viewpoint of man's development and his freedom was usually of a limited and elitist nature; K. Marx's ideas, on the other hand, on the prospects of social progress are distinguished by a distinct democratism: "Development of the capabilities of the genus 'man,' although initially accomplished thanks to the majority of human individuals and whole human classes even, will ultimately destroy this antagonism and coincide with the development of each separate individual."³

Invariably emphasizing the contradictions and antisocial features of the bourgeois system, V.I. Lenin saw "the progressive significance of capitalism...precisely in the fact that it has destroyed man's former limited living conditions which had engendered mental obtuseness and denied the producers themselves the possibility of taking their fate into their own hands. The tremendous development of trade relations and world exchange and the constant movements of huge masses of the population have broken up the primordial bonds of family, home and territorial community and created that diversity of development and 'diversity of talents and wealth of social relations' which plays such a big part in the West's most recent history."⁴

Such are the initial premises. Switching to the social reality of the developing countries, we will first attempt to evaluate a number of the variants of a criterion (or criteria) of progress which have been suggested in scientific literature (or stated in the political declarations of the leaders of certain countries) and then offer a total combination of interconnected criteria corresponding, in our view, to the set task.

This parameter or other of different countries' economic growth (rate, level, structural changes in the production forces and so forth) is frequently a subject of paramount attention during a comparison of the results of their social development. This is undoubtedly an important characteristic, the significance of which is particularly great under the conditions of a "poor" society. Other conditions being equal, social relations affording greater opportunities for economic growth may be considered more progressive; the relative facility of a quantitative expression of the results of such growth seemingly imparts to it a universalism which is so important for a comparative criterion.

However, this universalism proves deceptive precisely because the "other conditions" are, as a rule, unequal and the development of the production forces is just one of the prerequisites, albeit a very important one, of the achievement of society's

long-term goals and the solution of urgent social problems. The notions to the effect that a high and stable economic growth rate is the exhaustive (or, at least, main) indicator of the progressiveness of this social organism or the other is being criticized increasingly sharply both in the West and in the developing countries themselves.⁵

True, the growth of the production forces as the final criterion of social progress could be interpreted in greater depth--with regard for the refinement of the social characteristics of the labor force. Putting it this way introduces important amplifications, of course, but is, we believe, inadequate. The wealth of the individual's social connections and relations is not reduced to production. Movement along the path of social progress is not exhausted by the development of man's attributes as a producer.

This by no means takes away from the significance of the development of the production forces as a key prerequisite and a main condition of social progress, although the difficulties of the transformation of primitive economic forms, disenchantment with the possibilities of capitalist industrial growth and the exacerbation of global ecological-resource problems have long been engendering anti-industrial, antitechnicist and anti-urbanist sentiments in the developing countries.

The ideas concerning the lack of necessity for and harmfulness even of the development of modern production and the forms of life which it determines (we shall not concern ourselves with entirely different questions here--time periods, occurrence in stages, choice of technology and so forth) are a typical ideological mythologem. Following it leads to wherever one wishes, only not to progress. It is fitting to quote in this connection K. Marx's observation made back in the 1840's: "Real liberation cannot be effected other than in the real world and by real means...people cannot be liberated until they are in a position to provide themselves fully both qualitatively and quantitatively with food and drink, shelter and clothing. 'Liberation' is a historical matter and not a matter of thought, and historical relations and the state of industry, trade, farming and intercourse will lead to it."⁶

Consequently, production-economic parameters cannot be taken as the final criterion of general social progress not because they are unimportant--no social progress, particularly in the developing countries, is conceivable without production growth--but because such growth, whether it be expressed in an increase in the gross domestic product and the production of industrial products, steel and energy or an increase in production capacity, still does not, until the social results of the use of the increased product are examined--and here lies the rational grain of the "alternative" and "differing" development concepts--reveal the nature of social development.

Marxist literature frequently views as a most important criterion of the progress of multiple-structure societies the set of socioeconomic transformations which thoroughly intrude upon ownership relations: agrarian reforms, nationalization of foreign and local capitalist enterprises and so forth, transformations which are implemented the most consistently upon the transition to a noncapitalist development path. This approach has won extensive recognition in the developing world; it is exerting an undoubted influence on non-Marxist theoretical thought and the development of socioeconomic development strategies. The question, however, is which aspects of the noncapitalist development path are among the prerequisites of and which the criteria

proper of social progress. Could the initial act performed predominantly in the political sphere--the very choice of development path--and not its concrete practical embodiment and its real social effects (whose elucidation takes a certain time) be regarded as the final criterion of progress? Is it possible merely on the basis of the policy proclaimed by the ruling circles to delimit progressive and regressive phenomena and evaluate the complexities, contradictions and zigzags of the historical process in the totality of countries which are a part of the developing world?

The choice of a socialist orientation even where it is underpinned by a set of profound transformations could be (or not) merely the first stage in the transition from a lower formation (or a multiple-structure society with an unevolved formation-al structure) to a higher formation. As the experience of recent decades has shown (Egypt, Ghana, Mali), it is reversible. Prerequisites for such counterattacks and degenerations are contained in the fact that a number of negative social phenomena like corruption, nepotism, economic and administrative inefficiency, the stagnation of or slow rise in the living standard, the passiveness of the masses, nondemocratic methods of control and so forth are rooted in the existing socioeconomic and socio-cultural structure of many developing countries. The choice of a progressive orientation in itself--taking into account the specific forms of political leadership in certain states and the absence of a broad proletarian class basis--is not sufficient for putting up a relatively reliable barrier against them. Finally, a noncapitalist choice has as yet been made by only some developing states; yet an important task of Marxist analysis is to reveal the elements of social progress in the countries which have been drawn into the channel of capitalist development also.

In an evaluation of socioeconomic transformations, whose significance for social progress in the developing countries can hardly be exaggerated and which are being accomplished in countries of both a socialist and capitalist orientation, it is evidently essential to also shift the accent to their efficiency and direct reflection in the living conditions of the working majority of the population. The anti-imperialist, antifeudal and so forth thrust of these transformations ensues from the objective state of affairs and is supported by millions of people. But the abolition (or loosening) of the type of exploiter relations whose nucleus is dependence on imperialism, particularly in the crudest and most unconcealed forms, does not always lead to their replacement with more progressive relations even, it would seem, under favorable conditions, when the national bourgeoisie is weak and cannot replace the imperialist exploiters. Anti-imperialist declarations and even actions, directed to a greater or lesser extent against this former colonial power or other or certain aspects of its policy and against groups of the social agents of imperialism which have compromised themselves, have become widespread in the developing world. However, it is not in all instances that anti-imperialism is combined with the establishment of truly progressive economic and social relations. It frequently conceals the ambitious aspirations and interests of "subimperialist" centers taking shape on the periphery of the world capitalist economy. It sometimes becomes an implement of new groups which burst through to power on the anti-imperialist wave and which have come to replace the old exploiter strata and at the same time are opposed to the working majority of society and are implanting specific forms of exploitation and regression. We recall the situation in Uganda, whose population in the period 1971-1979 was under the power of a military regime which was subjectively neither pro-imperialist nor procapitalist but which had brought the country's economy to the point of profound decay and deprived the working people of elementary rights.

An even more tragic nature was assumed by the events in Kampuchea in the period 1975-1979—a cruel social experiment applied to the whole country, the fearful details of which have now been broadly illustrated in the press. In other words, we cannot exaggerate the progressiveness of a rejection of the obsolete if it has still to be revealed how the change of regime has been reflected in the immediate living conditions of the working people's masses and the elevation of which classes, existing or being formed, is served by this social transformation or the other.

It is also essential to consider that the features of a far more conservative socio-cultural system are superimposed, as a rule, on the socioeconomic and political processes proper in multiple-structure countries. The most important social institutions (like the family and, particularly, the position of the woman in it, the caste system, school, church and so forth) and society's value orientation based on centuries-old tradition perceive the impulses emanating from the socioeconomic sphere—the impact of industrialization, urbanization and social and political reforms—only indirectly, via a number of intermediate elements and late in the day.

The effect of social transformations is frequently "dissolved," as it were, and the traditional structures are restored in new forms, forming obstacles on the path of social development which are hard to surmount.

Thus socioeconomic transformations in the developing countries could become and, as a rule, really do become a most important instrument of social progress, but are not of themselves the criterion thereof. Their role in social development may be properly evaluated only in inseparable connection with the conditions under which they are implemented and the results which they produce.

An interesting attempt to put forward a "comprehensive" criterion of social progress corresponding to the conditions of various, including developing, countries and shifting the accent from the socioeconomic to the sociocultural sphere was made by Academician P.L. Kapitsa. In a search for an "objective and monosemantic" answer to the question of "what determines the progressiveness or backwardness of any existing social structure" he builds the following chain of reasoning. Culture is divided into material and spiritual. The level of material culture is determined mainly by aggregate national wealth. The unrestricted growth of material consumption is harmful and applies the brakes to spiritual development to a certain extent. Spiritual culture is another matter. It "ensures for people the happiest existence" and for this reason "should form the basis of an evaluation of the progressiveness of a country's social system.... What is foremost in man's evolutionary development is a social structure which should depend on the quality of a country's spiritual culture and the degree of harmoniousness of the development of the personality."⁷

We support the theoretical inspiration of this approach inasmuch as it helps us to view things in a new way and go beyond the framework in which the problem of progress is frequently interpreted. It would appear necessary, however, to make a number of observations. First, since it is connected with spiritual culture the stated criterion is based not only on the strict findings of science but also on the values accepted by the scientists and for this reason is neither entirely objective nor monosemantic. Second, it seems to us that it is "attached" too rigidly to the conditions of developed societies with their approximation (quite problematical, it should be said, particularly if we recall the millions of unemployed) to

satisfaction of elementary material requirements. Third, however broadly the concept of spiritual culture is interpreted here, it nonetheless does not embrace all the important aspects of social development and, consequently, progress. In the quite general form in which it has been proposed it does not allow of even approximate measures. Finally, the system-forming principles of the organization and main features of spiritual culture can hardly be drawn up in accordance with the "higher-lower," "better-worse" principle. Determining the "quality of spiritual culture" and the "degree of harmoniousness of development of the personality" is difficult not only because the decision is still left to the scholar, who defines his attitude toward progress by proceeding from the standards of the culture to which he belongs, but also because the development of spiritual culture does not always and entirely proceed in rectilinear progression, and it cannot be said with all certainty what in this process is "lower" and what "higher".⁸

A paradoxical situation thus takes shape: many authors address the concept of progress, but it has not yet become a strictly scientific category based on more or less generally recognized criteria (in any event, with respect to the developing countries).⁹ Furthermore, the proposition concerning the incomparability of the progress of different societies inasmuch as its criteria are allegedly heterogeneous in principle has become widespread in foreign literature.

Recognition of the profound distinctiveness of the development of oriental and other non-European societies does not signify a denial of the universal regularities of the world historical process and does not make for an understanding of progress other than as a progressive process of the growth of man's material and spiritual forces and his liberation from poverty, ignorance and demeaning conditions of social inequality and predetermination of the life path of individuals and social classes by external conditions, various forms of economic and political oppression and so forth.

Truly progressive social development under contemporary conditions presupposes that it is not enclosed within elitist groups of the population and that its benefits gradually extend to the majority of society. This means that the development of the individual is inseparable from the inception of foremost classes and strata and the formation of the social attributes thereof which correspond not only to the national level of development of the production forces but also certain world standards of social development and inseparable from the growth of the social activeness of the working people's masses. For the main line of historical progress has been drawn by movement toward "an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all."¹⁰

The developing countries are already tuning their economies to the technological method of production--industrial and, subsequently, scientific-technical--which has evolved (or is evolving) in the more developed countries. In this direction there is no noncatastrophic route back (or even "sideways"); even the most elementary conditions of society's existence cannot be maintained without familiarization with the achievements of modern technical civilization (however distinctively this familiarization may proceed). But modern technology and its corresponding elements of new economic organization cannot function conflict-free in a social environment directed by the old standards and traditions. Therefore a tendency toward this alternative variant of development or the other is progressive to the extent that it presupposes the forward movement and not the stagnation of society, adapts and does not reject the experience of peoples which have accomplished an industrial and embarked on the scientific-technical revolution and relates to means not ends.

We shall attempt to develop this, as yet still quite general, proposition in the form of a set of criteria on whose basis a verification of the social effectiveness of economic growth, social transformations (in a long-term respect) and the political system--with reference to the conditions of the developing countries--may, we believe, be effected with the greatest clarity.

The first three criteria embrace the most important, more or less autonomous spheres of people's vital activity in their qualitative and quantitative characteristics: consumption, labor and culture. The fourth and fifth, related to all spheres of vital activity (including the three above), focus attention on the degree of social equality and society's recognition of its role and the nature of the social barriers, which are preserved in any class-antagonistic society, and also on the methods, scale and mechanisms of social integration, supplementing and checking the findings which may be obtained with respect to the first three.

Thus the first criterion is the magnitude, composition and structure of material consumption in its relation to the historically conditioned system of society's requirements. K. Marx viewed consumption as a component of social production understood in the broad sense. In the categorical series "production-distribution-exchange-consumption" it acts as the closing, final link in a chain which determines the purpose and stimuli of production activity and from which to a decisive extent we may, properly speaking, judge the level and efficiency of social production as a whole. "A product, as distinct from a simple object of nature," K. Marx emphasized, "manifests itself as such and becomes a product only in consumption.... Consumption is the goal for production...production is the outward object for consumption and consumption is the mentally conceived object for production."¹¹

The development of human society from the viewpoint of this criterion may be presented in outline thus. First, the semistarvation, ill-provided existence of the majority of the members of society; extraction (production) of the most elementary means of existence at this stage--literally a question of life and death. Then society achieves standards more or less satisfying people's vital requirements, and simultaneously there is a revolution in the set of requirements and the emergence above each elementary requirement of a certain social "superstructure": requirements are satisfied in increasingly intricate forms which are determined not biologically but socially (not satiety in general but a certain set of food products, not clothing in general but in accordance with fashion, not movement in general but in comfortable and rapid transport and so forth). Finally, in the process of long historical development society approaches a level where material consumption, it may be assumed, will occupy a comparatively modest place in the structure of human vital activity; it will be superseded by values of a different kind, and a critical attitude toward "propertyism" and the "consumer society" and rational self-limitation (the latter is clearly characteristic of a society which has overcome class-antagonistic contradictions) emerge.

A specific feature of transitional multiple-production-mode structures is that they find themselves at all the stages described above simultaneously, as it were. Hundreds of millions of people are being held back here in conditions wherein their most elementary requirements are not being satisfied, and millions are dying annually from starvation and disease. ILO experts have designated three different levels of "poverty" in the developing countries. The first level--the "West European poverty

standard" (a per capita income equal to unemployment benefits in Great Britain and France per individual without dependents)--left, according to calculations based on data for 1972, 84 percent of the developing world's population or 1.5 billion persons below the "poverty line". The second level is "profound poverty" (a per capita income less than the wages of an unskilled worker at a large enterprise in India). Some 1.21 billion proved to be below this level (67 percent of the population). The bottom, third, poverty threshold is "destitution level" (an income of less than 1 rupee per person per day). Some 706 million persons (39 percent of the population) were below this line.¹²

As far as the published data allow us to judge, the absolute number of those living in dire poverty continued to increase in the 1970's and approached 800 million persons by 1978, while their proportion of the population stabilized at a level of approximately 40 percent. According to a report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, these are people living in conditions of "absolute poverty"--"on the very limit of vital resources". Their diet is bad and their shelter unsatisfactory, and the access to education and health care for them is inadequate. "Many of these people have experienced no improvement in living conditions, and in countries where economic growth has been slow, the living standard of the poor has in all likelihood deteriorated."¹³

A considerably larger proportion of the population lives below all of the three said thresholds in the developing countries than in the developed capitalist states, where, according to national standards, the number of those living below the poverty line in the 1970's constituted from 8 to 15 percent of the population and only in Ireland, which occupies an intermediate position between the two groups of countries, 24 percent.¹⁴

The scale of the spread of poverty in the developing countries is historically unprecedented. There is nothing similar to it not only in modern but also medieval European history. The data gathered by the Italian scholar C. Cipolla is of interest in this respect. In accordance with the ideas of his time--and only such ideas are meaningful in an evaluation of such a highly relative social category as "poverty"--the number of "poor," "destitute" and "those dragging out a wretched existence" in various cities and localities of Europe in the XV-XVIII centuries fluctuated within the limits of 6-9 to 18-20 percent, and only in Britain, in the estimates of various scholars, did the number of poor people and unemployed by the time of the end of the War of the Roses and at the end of the XVI century approach 25 percent of the population.¹⁵

Whereas yesterday the semistarvation existence of tens and hundreds of millions of people in the developing countries was the norm, today such a situation is interpreted as extraordinary and intolerable. This is an important manifestation of social progress: the increased value of human life in the public (mass) mind.

Not has the "revolution of requirements" bypassed the developing countries, however. It is not only a question of the scandalous consumption of a small parasitical upper clique oriented in this respect toward the highest world standards. The structure of the requirements and consumption of increasingly broad strata of the population, including those far from material sufficiency as per the norms of a developing society, is changing under the influence of cultural contacts. The image of a nomad

on a camel, to whose packloads a transistor is strapped, of which there have been many editions, is just one striking expression of this process.

Finally, as a reaction to the elitist groups' race for consumer items a mood of militant anticonsumerism and a defense of poverty, frequently ascending to the ideology of the "new left" in the West, are gathering strength, mainly among the marginal strata and part of the intelligentsia; they are sometimes employed by ruling circles in the East to justify the fact that the working people in their countries are deprived of important modern benefits in the name of alleged "common goals," which in reality conceal the mercenary interests of the ruling groups. Experiments in the forcible limitation of consumption are being declared models for emulation.

Thus odd symbioses of the extraneous features of different eras of the development of the contemporary system of requirements and consumption in the currently developed states lie and are taking shape in the social soil of the developing countries. Currently the most acute and most important problems, at least in the majority of developing countries, are still related to the lower level of historical development in this sphere. In accordance with this, the progress that has been achieved in the sphere of consumption should probably be evaluated primarily according to the degree of the majority of the population's liberation from material want, poverty and starvation and according to the extent to which the inhabitants have been extricated from the threat of death by starvation, how far infant mortality has been reduced and so forth.

At the same time we cannot fail to note that a complex set of problems, which do not have simple solution variants, of the second stage is coming into view increasingly distinctly in the developing world. For a rise in the living standard of the working majority above the line of the physical minimum (that is, securing, albeit partially, what has been achieved in this sphere by the working people of the developed capitalist states), as, equally the development of a more modern system of requirements, is also a task of the present day and not tomorrow. It is indisputable that this process should--from the viewpoint of social progress--be tied in with the solution of the previous problem. The frequent lack of coordination between them is a deformation of social evolution in the developing world. However, attempts to determine a strict "historical timetable" in accordance with which the satisfaction of all requirements of a higher order should be deferred until the "primary" requirements on the scale of the society as a whole have been satisfied seem to us groundless, harmful and dangerous.

Groundless because no one has yet succeeded in earnest and for long in driving the genie back into the bottle, and the genie of "demonstrable effect" has already revealed its ubiquitousness. Harmful because since this concerns not small parasitical groups which are dysfunctional from the viewpoint of development but, say, the middle urban strata, skilled workers and so forth attempts to limit and organize their consumption by quantity mean stifling the stimuli to economic activity and social activeness in general, which are so necessary. Dangerous because far-reaching control from above impedes the formation of a gainfully employed civil society and is fraught with catastrophes along Kampuchean lines.

It is true, of course, that "satisfaction of the most urgent and 'mass' requirements can in no way be cut short, deferred or sacrificed merely on the grounds that higher social requirements and consumer standards exist in the world."¹⁶ But it is no less correct also that attempts to block for a long time (and not in extreme situations) not only the quantitative but also the qualitative growth of consumption of the strata of the population which are most directly connected with the coming into being of modern production forces would put serious obstacles in the way of social progress. For consumption, including material, "property" consumption, also participates in the formation of the personality, and the following thought of K. Marx and F. Engels has not lost its significance in the least in the "age of mass consumption": "Property, if there is a necessary quantity thereof, stimulates the inculcation of a capacity for selection and broadens the perception. After a certain boundary, the mass consumption of the working people thereby contributes to the formation of individuality and democratizes the prerequisites of the development of the personality, although it is not in itself, of course, yet identical with this development."¹⁷

The second criterion is related to the sphere of labor. Whereas in the sphere of consumption the exclusiveness of the situation in the developing countries is connected with a kind of stratification of various problems known (in the past or present) to all class-antagonistic societies, the problems of labor here are unique.

The most common characteristic of the processes occurring in this sphere is that the reproduction of manpower and production of the social product are disconnected: the manpower entering (or potentially ready to enter) the labor sphere does not correspond to the objective requirements of economic development in at least three respects. It is quantitatively surplus compared with the existing possibilities of productive application; it is unsuited in a professional-qualifications respect to the actual structure of work (for performance of part of which there is a shortage of local skilled manpower, while elsewhere, on the other hand, skills which have not been arrived at cheaply remain unutilized); and its behavioral stereotypes are still being formed under the strong influence of the standards of the traditional society and do not correspond to the rhythm of the contemporary production process.

Proceeding from this, it is possible to concretize a criterion of social progress in the labor sphere: it is determined here primarily by successes in reducing the scale of manifest and concealed unemployment. The elimination of enforced idleness, to which tens and hundreds of millions of people are condemned, is among the most urgent and vital tasks in many countries: by the end of the 1970's the numbers of unemployed with respect to the developing world as a whole had risen to 40 million (5.2 percent of the labor force) and of the partially unemployed¹⁸ to 291 million (40 percent).¹⁹

The problem of less-than-full or nonproductive employment in the currently developed capitalist countries at the corresponding stage of economic development reached far from such seriousness and was solved, as is known, by way of the transfer of the "surplus" population from agriculture to the industrial sectors (and then the services sphere). The developing countries' possibilities in this respect are limited: in 1978 only 18 percent of the gross domestic product was produced in their agriculture, but roughly 60 percent (according to our estimates) of the gainfully employed population was employed therein,²⁰ while employment in the industrial and service sectors is increasing really quite slowly. For this reason progress in the labor sphere may be achieved not only by way of a rearrangement of the sectorial

structure of employment but also--and mainly--by the creation of conditions for the expansion and an increase in the efficiency of employment in agriculture itself. Given these circumstances, a truly progressive social policy could not fail to concentrate on the solution of the problem of productive employment. But all the problems which exist in the social labor sphere cannot be reduced to this.

Progress in this sphere presupposes a refinement of the professional-qualifications structure of manpower and the increasing extension of the sphere and also a consistent increase in the relative significance of modern forms of labor at the expense of quasimodern and of these latter at the expense of traditional forms. The growth of labor productivity accompanying this process acts, consequently, as an indicator not only of the economic efficiency but also of the social quality of labor.

Finally, progressive development in the labor sphere includes a refinement not only of the technological but also social attributes of the worker. It would, of course, be unrealistic to evaluate these attributes in terms of the models of the developed countries, which represent the product of a lengthy historical process and, frequently, of the cruel school of capitalism. But it cannot be said that such models are in no way related to the needs of a developing society. Much in them enables us to chart the direction of development and determine its parameters, with "room for growth," so to speak. It is a question of organization and discipline, a capacity for labor initiative and self-organization in large-scale collective production, the gradual expansion of the zone of meaningful, creative labor, a capacity for a periodic change of labor and, particularly, recognition of class interests and the conversion of the working people's solidarity into a stable standard of behavior.

The third criterion characterizes the changes in the cultural sphere. Inasmuch as development of material culture is already covered to a considerable extent by the criteria of consumption and labor we imply here mainly the spiritual culture of the individual and society. Material culture in this connection is important merely to the extent to which it embodies society's cultural-creative potential. In cultural development on the periphery of the nonsocialist world it is possible to distinguish two interconnected but different streams, each of which has its own content and signals the presence of progress (or absence of such) in its own way.

The upper, surface stratum of cultural development is the spread "in breadth" of general and specific information, in which man's worldly, production, technical, scientific, artistic, moral and so forth experience is impressed. This process is characteristic of any society in this form and on this scale or other. Its specific feature in the developing countries at the current stage is the explosive spread to tens and hundreds of millions of people of explosively expanding information.

The material basis of this process is the development of education and the mass communications media. It is sufficient to mention that merely in the period 1950-1975 the population of the corresponding age groups involved in primary education increased from 31 to more than 60 percent, secondary education from 7 to 35 percent and higher education from 1 to almost 7 percent.²¹ True, in this sphere, as in other spheres, of social life the processes are proceeding extremely unevenly: in the proportion of illiterates among the adult population the developing world in the mid-1970's was at the level of West Europe in the middle of last century and in number of students per 10,000 inhabitants at the level of the middle of our century.²²

But in any event the range of knowledge, ideas and skills of the individual is widening with unprecedented intensiveness, the framework of tribal and caste consciousness is being eroded and cultural provincialism is being undermined. All this is serving as an essential prerequisite of millions of people's genuine assimilation of cultural values.

At the same time the experience of recent decades has provided much new corroboration of the well-known truth that the growth of education and knowledgeability does not exhaust cultural development and does not coincide with the development of culture "in depth". The "cultural" and quasicultural "revolutions" of recent decades have brought to light the menacing social dangers for real progress connected with the sudden emergence in (or, more precisely, escape into) the social arena of large masses of "semi-educated" young people. There have also been revealed blind alleys of "mass culture," perception of which "inevitably proves passive and purely consumerist: not only is there no direct reverse impact on the communicator here but the barriers of interpretation (the illusion of direct accessibility), a critical attitude and specific interests are absent or have been considerably lowered; in short, the selectivity of perception is at its lowest here."²³ The quoted observations of the Soviet philosopher apply to bourgeois society. In multiple-structure countries the "standards of universal uniformity" in norms, knowledge and tastes, when they do not concur with traditions, are not introduced so easily. But there is a sphere in which this sometimes occurs with threatening rapidity. This is the sphere of a political subculture (in such cases it is probably more accurate to speak of an "anticulture") where the dissemination of stereotypes, illusions and myth-making distortedly reflecting real experience enables various adventurists to rapidly form their political armies and does not encounter sufficient barriers in the form of the capacity of the progressive classes and strata for self-organization and independent appearance in the arena of political struggle.

It should also be taken into account that the phenomenon of "mass culture" along education and communications channels is conveyed to the developing countries from the developed capitalist countries in far from the best models.

All this forces us to evaluate the progressive significance of the surface stratum of cultural development with a certain reserve (although generally positively). Its significance amounts mainly to the formation of conditions for the ability, desire and capacity to assimilate the real achievements of world, including, of course, national, culture. In this deep-lying stream of cultural development--if the individual has succeeded in making himself a part of it--he becomes not a consumer but a participator in creativity.

An attitude toward cultural values and their content is established in people's minds and behavior which determines the attitude of the individual toward himself and those like him and toward nature and the environment created by technical civilization and reflects the degree of the release of the individual and society from the power of natural forces and the scale (and thrust) of their self-expression, the surmounting of individual and social inaction, the level of humanization of labor, social life and intercourse and so forth. The question of the methodology with which the deep-lying processes of cultural development may be evaluated remains open in science. It is even more difficult today to conceive of prospects of the mutual influence and interpenetration of the cultures of the modern world, which frequently differ from one another not in secondary characteristics but in system-forming principles.²⁴

The fourth criterion reveals the changing extent of the spread and the depth of the various forms of social inequality which are in principle inherent in any antagonistic society; the measures which are being chosen to limit if only some of these forms (or the absence of such measures); results which have been achieved; and the place which society assigns social equality in the series of its goals (if there is such a goal even).

The classical authors of Marxism-Leninism saw as a progressive role of capitalism, inter alia, the fact that it had broken down the age-old barriers which had reinforced class, ancestral and other forms of inequality and had exercised the principle of the legal equality of all before the law. Under capitalism the attitude toward wealth and capital is established as the universal principle of social differentiation. This does not mean, of course, that only property inequality is preserved in modern bourgeois society. In the sum total of its forms social inequality under capitalism has in certain respects become even more profound than before. In this system, however, there exist a number of important phenomena which do not alter its essence but which, strictly speaking, also represent elements of social progress within the framework of the capitalist formation. The main one is undoubtedly the social gains of the working class and its allies.

Social development in this sphere on the periphery of the nonsocialist world is determined to a decisive extent by the presence (or absence) of the political prerequisites of social progress, which ultimately express the correlation of the class forces and sociocultural system of society. Among these are the nature of state power and the general orientation of social development it has adopted (and within its framework this "development philosophy" variant or the other distinguishing and ranking society's goals), the attitude toward the two world systems, perception of the ideas of scientific socialism (or renunciation thereof), the methods and political mechanisms with which society's goals are selected and realized, the maturity of the political awareness of the foremost classes and social strata, the presence (or absence) of an arena of open political struggle contributing to the cultivation and introduction of this consciousness of the masses, the capacity of the working people for self-organization and initiative and the possibility of democratic control from below. This list (incomplete, possibly) enables us to outline certain general directions in the formation of the political prerequisites of progress.

Meanwhile the actual situation in the majority of developing countries is characterized by the following features. First, the social inequality of the basic masses of the population is largely determined by the unequal position of these countries themselves in the world capitalist economy. Second, property inequality on the periphery of the nonsocialist world as a whole is more profound than in its centers. According to our estimate, the poorest 20 percent of the population in the developed capitalist and developing countries in the 1970's had more or less comparable proportions of distributable income--of the order of 5-6 percent (although this proportion was considerably lower in many developing states). But the wealthiest 5 percent of the population in the first group of countries received 16 percent and in the second approximately 25 percent of individual income.²⁵ As far as the incomplete data of historical statistics permit us to judge, the trend toward the concentration of income in the hands of the most well-to-do strata of the population has strengthened in the majority of developing countries.

Third, ownership of the landed aristocracy is preserved in many countries together with capitalist ownership, and the class, caste, ethno-national, religious and similar privileges and prohibitions are still very strong. Fourth, the class organization of the working people's masses, their capacity for imposing their concept of the interests of national development (if such a concept has been formulated, which as a rule, is not the case) on the ruling forces and their concrete social demands are considerably weaker than in the developed capitalist states. Fifth, inequality (and the more limited possibilities of social mobility and advancement) is maintained frequently not only by economic conditions but also sociocultural traditions. Sixth, superimposed on the traditional forms of inequality--particularly in the countries where rapid economic growth is occurring on a capitalist basis--are new forms of property contrasts connected with the success of the national bourgeoisie and bureaucracy and the strata associated with them.

The historical development of all antagonistic societies does not remove but merely modifies the forms of social inequality. Progress in this sphere is linked not so much with a reduction in the depth of inequality (sometimes it even increases) as with the transition from extra-economic, personal forms based on direct coercion or tradition to predominantly economic, impersonal and anonymous forms. An important manifestation of the influence of socialism on general world development in the modern era is stimulation of the struggle against all forms of social inequality. In the developing countries this struggle develops most often in three areas (separately or together): the developing society as a whole--against imperialism and against inequality in international relations and the privileges of foreign capital; the peasants (sometimes with the support of the national state and other forces)--against semifeudal latifundism; and all the poor and destitute torn away from the traditional conditions of their recent existence--against blatant, ostentatious unwonted forms of wealth (predominantly urban) with the new, "foreign" standards of consumption typical of them. Only in the most developed countries of the periphery of the nonsocialist world could the struggle of the proletariat against capitalist inequality be put on the same level as these streams, we believe, in its intensity, mass nature and achievements.

The problem of social contrasts will undoubtedly in the next few decades also remain most acute in the life of the developing countries. The significance of this problem is also particularly great because it makes it possible (perhaps more than anything else) to accumulate the revolutionary potential of the masses, for whom inequality in income and consumption is a most visible feature of the entire system of exploitation, oppression and injustice capable of eliciting the greatest anger. But property inequality represents only a superficial expression of the entire socioeconomic and sociocultural organization of society.

The elimination of certain manifestations of inequality is undoubtedly an urgent task in the majority of developing countries. It is a question primarily of the legacy of the colonial and precolonial era. But until the antagonistic nature of social development has been overcome, social progress presupposes not only the removal of some but also the preservation of others and, sometimes, an increase in third forms of inequality (for example, the high incomes of specialists who are essential to the country and rewards for private business in the spheres to which it has been permitted). Of course, the depth and spread of social contrasts

permissible from the standpoints of social progress cannot be unlimited in the modern era. But it should not be forgotten that the movement toward greater social equality represents just one of the areas of progress and that achievements in this area are not its sole criterion.

The fifth criterion envisages a reorganization of social relations which would make it possible to integrate society on a modern basis suited to the industrial method of production and open more favorable opportunities for man's development, the shaping of the personality, the broadening of the freedom of choice of path in life and the social activeness of the working people's masses.

The population of the majority of the developing countries is heavily disintegrated. Many experts²⁶ have drawn attention to the preservation of "compartments" in society which are relatively sharply delimited from one another. Oversimplifying the current situation in this sphere somewhat and rendering it more archaic, it may be represented in the following form (the statements adduced below apply to a greater extent to Asia and Africa than, for example, to the most developed Latin American countries and to the rural population and recent settlers in the cities than to the indigenous urban inhabitants).

1) The individual occupies a certain position, which is not chosen by him, as a rule, and which is sanctified by tradition and religion, within the framework of a primary collective which has evolved on a natural basis--the commune, tribe, caste, clan and so forth. In the accurate observation made by K. Marx, he himself is to a certain extent the property of the community;²⁷ the possibilities of his social mobility and transition to a different social group are tightly, if not completely, blocked off and his path in life is primordially preprogrammed.²⁸

2) The "primary collectives" and "involuntary associations" are connected by an inner solidity which goes back to the primitive state and which is preserved in traditional society by the sharp contrast between "we" and "they"; "we" always means people in the direct sense of the word, that is, people in general, whereas "they" means "not entirely people".²⁹ It is perhaps not entirely correct to apply this formula of the primitive society to a description of the current situation, but it is important that we emphasize that the ties binding man with his kinsmen are for vast masses of the population in the developing countries not simply stronger than, say, social-class ties but represent a different quality.

3) Inasmuch as a disintegrated society functions as a whole (in the accomplishment of broad production tasks, in relations with the outside world and so forth) the role of integrators therein is performed by the state and religion, which are elevated high above society.

Such a society is in pure form, of course, outside of the chronological framework of the modern period: the society in the developing countries now (with the exception of the most backward "corners" which have not been affected by the winds of history) is not traditional but hybrid. However such was the starting point of its movement in the not-too-distant past, which often determines important aspects of the present-day situation.

low, then, is it possible to represent the main directions of social progress viewed as a moving away from the type of society so described? At the individual level this is man's release from the power of tradition, alleviation of the conditions of social advancement, the broadening of social mobility in society and the individual's increasing identification not so much with his naturally evolved primary group as with this voluntary association or other and class which is taking shape and the nation. At the social group level it is the gradual surmounting of the exclusiveness of individual cells which have evolved on a traditional basis and then the withering away of such primary collectives; the formation of modern classes and social groups suited to industrial civilization, primarily of the foremost present-day class--the working class--which increasingly recognizes itself as a class, and also the national intelligentsia; and the replacement of tribal communities by modern-type ethnic groups. At the level of society as a whole this is differentiation of the spheres of social life and the institutions serving them and the development between different groups and strata of manifold relations which gradually acquire an increasingly intensive and spontaneous nature. In the political sphere this is the working people's familiarization with political life and the formation of organizations built on a democratic basis and leading the struggle for their recognized class interests; and the establishment of the role of the state in social processes, but not on an authoritarian but democratic basis.

We have no illusions either with respect to the times or the possibilities of the realization of such a "program" in full in the foreseeable future. But it is a question in this case not of a forecast of social development as a whole but of the revelation therein of progressive trends, certain prerequisites of the consolidation of which are being laid down within the developing countries by the socioeconomic changes and the gradual replacement of sociocultural stereotypes (with all the contradictoriness of the one and the other) which are occurring in them and, in the international arena, by the struggle of the democratic, socialist forces.

Such are the criteria which, it seems to us, will help run a kind of bridge between a general philosophical formulation of the problem of social progress and the individual evaluations of certain phenomena to which historians, economists and sociologists have recourse constantly. Reflecting the processes which are being accomplished in spheres of the social life of the developing countries and emphasizing attention to phenomena many of which may be expressed quantitatively and linked with certain important global trends, the proposed outline is open in principle to amplifications and additions. The author of this article has endeavored to draw attention to the theoretically less developed questions of social progress in the developing world at the intersection of different branches of knowledge.

Of course, in any class-antagonistic society forward movement in any of the areas outlined by the criteria formulated above has its own boundaries, which are sometimes quite rigid. Production and distribution relations in a society where the dominating positions are occupied by monopolist and elitist groups and capitalist and hierarchical structures hold back the growth of the working people's consumption, subordinate their work and free time to the interests of a small minority and split general human cultural values, substituting for them two offcuts--"elite" and "mass" cultures.

In the developing countries progressive trends are encountering not only these general but also most serious obstacles which are specific for these societies:

archaic relations and traditions, the consequences of colonialism, various forms of neocolonialist exploitation, problems posed by contemporary world development which are difficult to solve and the secondary results of progress itself. The criteria dealt with above outline only to a certain extent an ideal and hypothetical projection into the future of a number of objective processes corresponding, it would seem to us, to the general direction in the development of the production forces, culture and society. The actual process of historical development is, of course, more complex and less "happy". It is by no means exhausted by progressive features. "Imagining world history as moving smoothly and reliably forward without sometimes gigantic leaps backward," V.I. Lenin wrote, "is undialectical, unscientific and theoretically wrong."³⁰ The direction in which the consequences of the forces of social progress and the trends opposed to it on the periphery of the nonosocialist world will proceed in the next few decades will depend on many factors, an examination of which lies beyond the framework of this article.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], vol 2, p 91.
2. Ibid., vol 46, part I, p 476. See also: pp 483-484.
3. Ibid., vol 26, part II, p 123.
4. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 1, p 433. The words used by V. I. Lenin in quotation marks are taken from K. Marx.
5. We would note that Soviet scholars have long pointed to the unsuitability of the indicator of the economic growth rate as a determining criterion of general social progress. See, for example: N.P. Shmelev, "Problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta razvivayushchikhsya stran" [Problems of the Developing Countries' Economic Growth], Moscow, 1970, pp 133-155; L.A. Fridman, "Yegipt. 1882-1952. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya struktura derevni" [Egypt. 1882-1952. Socioeconomic Structure of the Countryside], Moscow, 1973, pp 319-322; "Razvivayushchiyesya stran: nauka, tekhnika, ekonomicheskii rost" [The Developing Countries: Science, Technology and Economic Growth], Moscow, 1975, pp 42-45.
6. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 42, p 349.
7. VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 1, 1979, pp 68-71.
8. The notions about the human personality characteristic of different civilizations are various. For example, according to N.I. Konrad, figures of the Chinese Renaissance saw the value of the human personality mainly in man's capacity for self-perfection; the humanists of Iran and Central Asia predominantly in the fact that the highest moral qualities were accessible to man: spiritual nobility, magnanimity and friendship; representatives of the Renaissance in Italy perceived man mainly as the purveyor of wisdom, considering wisdom the highest manifestation of the human principle (N.I. Konrad, "Izbrannyye trudy" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1974, p 318). If this is so, is it possible to determine which of these principles of spiritual culture is "higher"?

9. We would mention that three main standpoints (and a number of variants within each of them) also came to light in an interpretation of a general historical criterion of progress in the discussions of the 1960's-1970's among Marxist scholars. The first group of scholars (A.A. Makarovskiy, M.Ya. Koval'zon, I. Ya. Levyash, E. Arab-ogly and others) choose as such a criterion this characteristic or other of the production forces. The supporters of another approach (V.S. Semenov, R.V. Petropavlovskiy and others) put forward as the criterion the mode of production (or even the formation as a whole) and, consequently, the degree of approximation to a higher formation. Finally, the third standpoint (Yu. A. Semenov, B.F. Porshnev, I.S. Kon, A. Tsipko and others), to which we also subscribe, links the criterion with the development complication and enrichment of man's qualities and requirements and the broadening of the degrees of freedom of his choice and behavior--liberation from the power of spontaneous natural forces, the oppression of spontaneous social forces and social inequality and his own spiritual underdevelopment. Taking this as a general historical criterion, we attempt henceforward to interpret it with reference to the specific conditions of the developing countries.
10. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, p 447.
11. Ibid., vol 12, pp 717, 719.
12. ILO. "Employment, Growth and Basic Needs. A One-World Problem," Geneva, 1976, pp 21-22.
13. World Bank. World Development Report, 1978, Washington, 1978, pp III, 1, 3, 7.
14. UN Report on the World Social Situation, New York, 1978, p 26.
15. C.M. Cipolla, "Storia economica dell'Europa pre-industriale," Bologna, 1974, pp 38-39.
16. L.I. Reysner, "A Systemic Description of Social Reproduction in the Developing Countries: Formulation of the Question," "Problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta i nakopleniya v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [Problems of Economic Growth and Accumulation in the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1978, p 48.
17. Archives of K. Marx and F. Engels, vol II (VII), p 235.
18. The ILO puts among the partially unemployed in the developing countries (as distinct from the developed capitalist states) not only persons employed in an incomplete work day or only in seasonal work (lack of the necessary statistics makes this computation difficult) but also all those whose labor is so unproductive that it produces the minimum--according to the standards of the given society--income.
19. A. Beguele, D.H. Freedman, "Employment and Basic Need: an Overview," INTERNATIONAL LABOR REVIEW No 3, 1979, p 316.
20. Estimated from "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," vol II, 1979, p 330; ILO. Labor Force Estimates. 1950-2000, Geneva, 1977, vols I-V.

21. Estimated from P. Bairoch, "The Economic Development of the Third World Since 1900," London, 1975, pp 137-141; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, Paris, 1977.
22. Estimated from B. Mitchell, "European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970," New York, 1975, pp 19-24, 771-776; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1977; UNESCO, "Literacy 1969-1971," Paris, 1972, pp 17-23.
23. Yu.A. Levada, "The Strange World of Mass Culture," INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA No 11, 1971, p 243.
24. See: B.S. Yerasov, "World Culture and Cultural Regions," VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 1, 1978, pp 139-140.
25. Average indicators for 10 and 25 countries of the corresponding groups. Estimated from UN Report on the World Social Situation, New York, 1978, p 20; RISSENER RUNDBRIEF (Hamburg) No 6, 1980.
26. See, for example: R. Farley, "The Economics of Latin America: Development Problems in Perspective," New York, 1972, p 70; G. Myrdal, "Sovremennyye problemy 'tret'yego mira'" [Current Problems of the 'Third World'], Moscow, 1972, p 113.
27. See: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 46, part 1, p 485.
28. Interesting thoughts on this question are expressed by S.I. Korolev. See: "Klassoobrazovaniye na sovremennom Vostoke: problemy i tendentsii" [Class Formation in the Contemporary Orient: Problems and Trends], Moscow, 1978, pp 85-86.
29. See: B.F. Porshnev, "Sotsial'naya psikhologiya i istoriya" [Social Psychology and History], Moscow, 1979, p 82. A similar description of tribal consciousness in Tropical Africa is provided by V. Iordanskiy (see: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 1, 1980, pp 111-113).
30. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 30, p 6.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury", 1981

8850

CSO: 1807/23

LEADERS OF THIRD WORLD INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS PORTRAYED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, 1981 pp 191-197

[A.V. Gordon review of R.A. Ul'yanovskiy book on independence fighters*]

[Text] The book under review is unique. It is an unusual one for the author, who is known primarily for summary studies in the history of the national liberation movement and present-day problems of the political and economic position of the emerging countries.¹ It is also unusual for our theoretical oriental studies in general, which are endeavoring strenuously to grasp the nature of the changes occurring in Asia and Africa, relying mainly on mass-type quantitatively evaluated material. However, despite all the obvious advantages of broad-scale coverage, this approach reveals a shortcoming when phenomena of the sphere of social consciousness, the interaction of ideological influences and the peripeteias of the political struggle are the subject of research. And Soviet scholars have done much in this field also: a number of summary works has appeared on the ideology of the contemporary national liberation movement.² But it was frequently the case, unfortunately, that analysis in this sphere amounted to operating with general categories and the creation of quasisociological outlines in which political figures and ideologies were the object of rigid classification. Not only the individual distinctiveness but also the national, cultural and historical specifics were lost. What ultimately occurred was a rupture with the practice and the real conditions of the developing countries, in which "everything has been in upheaval and is only just settling down," and the contradictory combination of these processes frequently prevents us from making a monosemantic definition of this phenomenon or the other. The development of the genre of the political (and ideological) portrait observed recently was evidently a reaction to the said negative trends.

"History is made by the people's masses--this has been well known for a long time. But individual personalities become its symbols" (p 10)--this is how R.A. Ul'yanovskiy substantiates the scientific significance of the genre. Symbols, and not signs which are of no significance! The author selects the heroes of his book in accordance with this principle. Each of them symbolizes an era (however short-lived it might, perhaps, have been) in the life of his country, the fate of his continent and the development of the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and, consequently, the liberation of mankind as a whole. The book is, in the author's own definition, "a study of the life and struggle of outstanding figures of the national liberation movement" (p 5). The author makes the reservation that he did not set as his goal "a comprehensive study of the personalities" of Mohandas

*"Politicheskiye portrety bortsov za natsional'uyu nezavisimost'" [Political Portraits of Fighters for National Independence], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, pp 175.

Karamchand Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral and Franz Fanon, with whom the book deals. He has endeavored primarily to describe "the main social content" of their activity. But he did not consider it possible here to ignore personal qualities, making it his task to reveal those of them which in their connection with political qualities were of the greatest significance (p 3).

The author notes the "honesty and sincerity" of Gandhi and his other heroes (pp 14-15, 26, 61, 75, 157); in examining the development of the social views of these ideologists he writes about their personal sympathies and ideals and contemplates the combination of contradictoriness of world outlook and integrity of the personality. R.A. Ul'yanovskiy points to the social significance of the personal experience of this personality or the other and to the manifold consequences of the predominance of this feature or the other--modesty or ambitiousness, breadth of view or reserve--in his character and upbringing. The author repeatedly and precisely formulates the idea of the personal significance of his heroes, when he emphasizes, for example, that Gandhi's personal qualities "contributed to no less an extent than his philosophical-political doctrine and vigorous activity to the consolidation of India's national forces" (p 39) or when he writes that "the synthesis of broad outlook and a profound, comprehensive knowledge of the life of his peoples which characterized A. Cabral secured for the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde which he founded big successes in struggle and social transformations" (p 139). But in what instances and how these formulas are revealed is even more important.

Claiming to bring to light the "objective significance" of the views of this historical personality or the other and disregarding here as "subjectiveness," that is, something insignificant, his personal singularities and, for example, proclivities and aspirations, the ideals in which he believed, the conceptual apparatus with which he operated and so forth, certain scholars prove incapable of also revealing the singularities of the strata which this personality represented. We have a far from accidental coincidence here, I believe. The fruitfulness of the approach of the author of the work in question convinces us of this. Paying close attention to the personal qualities of the personalities described and the distinctiveness of the formation and evolution of their views. R.A. Ul'yanovskiy also successfully traces the connection between "the minds and the body public" which determines the objective significance of these views. The essay on Gandhi may serve as a remarkable example of the disclosure of this connection. The author outlines, inter alia, the unusual nature of Gandhi's slogans and tactics of mass action, and from the distinctiveness of this language of words and deeds with which Gandhi addressed the masses R. A. Ul'yanovskiy points to the transition to the distinctiveness of the masses themselves. Without substituting an ideological for a sociological analysis, this approach simultaneously provides the key to an evaluation of such a complex and contradictory personality as Gandhi and considerably enriches our ideas concerning the Indian peasantry, particularly its perception of the world and cast of mind.

I have already mentioned³ the methodological significance of the path outlined by the author of the work under review in an analysis of Gandhi's views at the end of which, in K. Marx's words, ideas become a "material force". All stages and direct communication and feedback are important on this path, which leads from unrecognized mass moods through their refraction in the individual creative thought

of the ideologist to their subsequent embodiment in the mass consciousness. The subjective, like the personal singularities of individual personalities which we have mentioned, may acquire objective social significance; the symbolic becomes a real political factor, like, say, the very names of Gandhi or Nehru in present-day India; and a reflection of reality becomes an expression which is used for varied, sometimes mutually exclusive interpretations thereof. Ideas have a life independent of the will of the author and even acquire the capacity for development in this direction or the other after his death. All this is portrayed well by the author in the examples of struggle surrounding the inheritance of Gandhi, Nehru or Fanon.

A number of other points, which are common to the entire book and important in a methodological respect, is also most clearly expressed in the essay on Gandhi. The author justifiably opposes an indiscriminate evaluation of utopian ideas as reactionary. Based on Gandhi's ideal of Sarvodaya--the "society of universal prosperity" in accordance with the mode of patriarchal peasant life--he shows that even archaic ideas which at first sight appeal exclusively to the past may serve the goals of a progressive movement if they are of a democratic nature and express the aspiration of the masses to social justice.

Just as instructive is the consistent distinction in the book between non-Marxist and anti-Marxist constructions. The so-called logic of the eliminated third sometimes still creeps in in evaluations of contemporary ideological currents. The outline created by this logic (Marxism or anti-Marxism, scientific socialism or bourgeois nationalism) is unsuitable in an analysis of the ideology of the contemporary national liberation movement for it ignores the dialectics of its development. The dialectical approach is directly opposed to such an outline, and the book's author demonstrates it when, for example, he writes of the concept of Nkrumah's "positive and negative action": "Here we have a kind of substantiation of the objectively necessary tactic of a single anti-imperialist front which does not ascend to a Marxist understanding of this question but which in principle does not contradict it either. In the course of the struggle and with the accumulation of experience this position could be suffused with Marxist content" (p 121).

The theme of "socialism and the emerging countries" occupies a central place throughout R.A. Ul'yanovskiy's work. A special monograph⁴ and many pages in other works have been devoted to it. It is very important in this book also. In describing Gandhi and Nehru and Nkrumah, Cabral and Fanon the author invariably raises the question of their attitude toward scientific socialism. The magnetic force of socialist ideas in the national liberation movement stand out in relief in the example of these ideologists and outstanding personalities. The driving motive in the general inclination toward socialism was for some, as R.A. Ul'yanovskiy shows, the historical optimism of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook, for others, the consistent democratism embodied in socialism and for yet others, the experience of the USSR's accelerated economic, social and cultural development. But the abundance of roads does not signify an easy route. On the contrary, the author emphasizes the complexity of the attitude of the ideologists of the national liberation movement whom he describes toward scientific socialism. A specific, one-sided and reduced interpretation of Marxism may be considered a characteristic feature. The teaching of K. Marx and V.I. Lenin is frequently interpreted as an ideology of class struggle and civil wars, as a strategy of revolutionary violence and as a "synonym for an exceptionally bloody armed struggle and armed violent movement" (p 65). And whereas such an interpretation made Marxism unacceptable,

as the work reveals, to Gandhi and his followers and also Nehru (even given the latter's understanding of the inevitability of class struggle and revolutionary violence in an exploiter society), certain other ideologists of the national liberation movement gravitated toward Marxism in precisely such an interpretation.

Profoundly instructive in this respect is the tragedy of Nkrumah, which is strikingly revealed in a description of the final period of his life. "After his defeat in the theoretical-methodological plane," R.A. Ul'yanovskiy writes, "Kwame Nkrumah became more mature. He took a new step toward scientific socialism, as it were. The assertion appears in his works that 'there exists only one true socialism--scientific socialism--whose principles are permanent and universal'.... In place of the illusions of the abatement of the class struggle, he arrived with great and tragic lateness at the clear conclusion: 'Socialism can be achieved only through the struggle of the classes'." But, having understood the role of class struggle, he perceived it "predominantly in a single form--armed--and extended it beyond time and space, without regard for concrete-historical conditions, to the entire African continent.... The obvious increase in Kwame Nkrumah's subjective socialist sentiments led him to proclaim socialism as the immediate task of the national liberation movement in present-day Africa." The final result was a "voluntarist program of leftist radicalism," the constitution of which was initiated by the "proclamation of armed struggle as the sole means of struggle" (pp 128-133).

In pondering the fate of the book's heroes one understands the need for a stricter approach in general to the statements concerning embarkation on the socialist path, the adoption of scientific socialism and so forth. Precisely by virtue of the "growth of subjective socialist sentiments" in the emerging countries it is far from always that such statements may serve as a reference point in a classification of these countries' leaders and ideologists. The contrast between the Nkrumah of the final years and another outstanding personality of the liberation movement in Africa--Cabral--is indicative. "Amilcar Cabral did not talk about socialism and did not consider this a timely slogan for the historical stage being experienced by the country.... He understood the profound contradictoriness of the development of former colonies and was able to combine fidelity to the socialist ideal with an awareness of the need for intermediate stages of the revolution.... Amilcar Cabral never called himself a supporter of scientific socialism or Marxism-Leninism. Fidelity to the ideals of socialism is far from always determined by declarations. In his theoretical and practical work he was guided by the principles of scientific socialism, and his entire life, which was given to the struggle for the happiness of his people, indisputably lies in the channel of Marxism-Leninism" (pp 150-151, 156).

Another typical feature impeding an adequate perception of Marxism is eclecticism. This is also shown in the book in the example of the same Nkrumah of the final years, who, in formulating the goals of the African liberation movement frequently mechanically included socialism and nationalism in a single whole (p 131). This is shown in even greater relief in the example of Nehru. "J. Nehru's world outlook," R. A. Ul'yanovskiy writes, "was formed under the influence of many schools. The influence of scientific socialism was manifested most distinctly in his views on the regularity of the historical process and the role of the masses." At the same time Nehru "had imbibed the traditions of ancient Indian culture and the rich history of its national liberation movement, particularly the philosophy and practice of Gandhism.

J. Nehru had assimilated everything that West European bourgeois liberalism had been able to offer, receiving an education in its cradle--Great Britain--and, disenchanted, turned to socialist ideas, initially in their Fabian interpretation" (pp 89-90). In a quest for all the best that man had created he endeavored, in his own words, "to understand and assimilate diverse religions, ideologies and political, social and economic systems." This approach could not have failed to have led to eclecticism. But R.A. Ul'yanovskiy is justly opposed to stopping at this definition in an evaluation of Nehru's world outlook. After all, Nehru, in the author's perspicacious observation, knew that no one had managed to create a "synthesis of ideologies" and endeavored to avoid eclecticism in every possible way (p 89). How, nevertheless, then to explain the slide of this man of high spiritual culture and great culture of thought in this direction?

The evaluations made in various parts of the book, the works of other Soviet experts on the ideology of the national liberation movement⁵ and, finally, my own observations⁶ enable us to express the supposition that the elements of eclecticism in the constructions of this ideologist or the other of this movement conceal, hypothetically speaking, the eclecticism of life: the drama of peoples which, while fighting against foreign oppressors had to assimilate their achievements, culture and language; the combination of the uncombinable in the so-called colonial process; and the combination of diverse and at times mutually exclusive trends in the development of the postcolonial societies. We have to take account of the objective complexity of the combination of socialist ideals with the immediate goals of various detachments of the contemporary national liberation movement, the contradictory unity of the traditional and the modern in the life of the emerging countries and the need for the synthesis of the national and the international in the development of their culture. We have to evaluate the entire immensity of the problem of the choice confronting the ideologists, political figures and peoples of these countries, which are at a turning point in their history.

The essays included in the book were in their original versions written at different times, and each of them was a significant event in Soviet oriental and African studies. For the first time the essay on Nkrumah provided a general description of the path in life of the first president of the first liberated country of Tropical Africa, including its final and virtually most complex period. R. A. Ul'yanovskiy was one of the first Soviet scholars to make a high evaluation of the leader of the Guinea-Bissau liberation movement--Cabral. The essay on Fanon put an end to the undeserved mistrust of the outstanding Algerian revolutionary and consolidated the evaluation of him as a genuine revolutionary democrat. Particular mention should be made of the essay devoted to Gandhi. This is not simply the largest part of the book (almost half of it) and not only the most important section in a methodological respect. This essay is of great historiographical interest for Soviet oriental studies. R.A. Ul'yanovskiy's first work on Gandhi appeared 50 years ago,⁷ and in 1934 he translated and published Gandhi's autobiography.⁸ Thus there is half a century of the author's life and half a century of his oriental research in the political portrait of Gandhi in the book. It is from this considerable distance that R. A. Ul'yanovskiy evaluates the early Soviet works on Gandhi and reveals the reasons for the appearance of erroneous propositions in them. In this thorough analysis (pp 51-52) let us draw attention to one which the author himself puts in the foreground--"insufficient knowledge of India and its specific conditions and profoundly original national traditions, which

were so strikingly reflected in Gandhism." The disclosure of this shortcoming stimulates Soviet scholars to an intensification of research in this field.

R.A. Ul'yanovskiy also deals with the recent disputes as to whether Gandhi's teaching is bourgeois or petit bourgeois in its social essence. He suggests, I believe, a fruitful alternative to the viewpoints of the participants in this debate, which has become somewhat abstract. "Gandhi combined," R.A. Ul'yanovskiy writes, "the thinker-utopian whose views were rooted in the mentality of the peasantry and a sober-minded farsighted politician who objectively acted in the interests of the national bourgeoisie, which logically acted as the purveyor of national aspirations. This combination did not contribute to the full and consistent manifestation in Gandhi's ideology of features inherent in the peasantry." But "we should not see Gandhism merely as the objective expression of the interests of the national bourgeoisie in the liberation movement." It was "a phenomenon of the national life of a peasant country and for this reason...could not have failed to have reflected in distinctive form the spontaneous aspiration of the Indian toiler to social justice going beyond the framework of the class interests of the bourgeoisie" (pp 25-26).

In the light of these conclusions particular meaning is attached to R.A. Ul'yanovskiy's reminder of the methodological importance in a description of Gandhism of Lenin's works on L.N. Tolstoy (p 33). R.A. Ul'yanovskiy notes the significance of Lenin's evaluations for a clarification of features of the ideological proximity of the two thinkers, and this also is very significant historiographically. There was a time when Tolstoy and Gandhi were brought excessively close together and then when their differences were one-sidedly exaggerated and the mere juxtaposition of the two names even was avoided. I believe that here also, shunning extremes, the book's author charts the most fruitful path. It is not, of course, a question of the Tolstoyism of Gandhi and the Gandhism of Tolstoy. But the brilliant analysis of the phenomenon of Tolstoy as "a mirror of our revolution" ("peasant bourgeois," in Lenin's definition) will undoubtedly stimulate research into such an aspect of Gandhi's ideas. And the analysis of Tolstoy's anticapitalism or the embodiment in his views of a peasant endeavor "to create in the place of a police-class state a society of free and equal small peasants"⁹ is important for an understanding of Gandhi's social ideal. Finally, Lenin's definition of Tolstoyism as the "ideology of an oriental system"¹⁰ probably points to the most general basis for a comparison of the two thinkers. Thus the theme "Gandhi and Tolstoy" cannot be overlooked, and, possibly, a future scholar will add to this pair a further historical personality who exerted on Tolstoy no less influence than Tolstoy on Gandhi. I refer to J.J. Rousseau. With such an addition to the historical ranks it should become clearer that it is not a question here of direct analogies and not, for example, the degree of love of the peasantry and not of concrete singularities of view in general. That which is common should be sought in the position of these thinkers at a certain boundary in the history of these countries and in their high-minded attitude toward this boundary. The world outlook of these people of different origins, cultures and even spheres of activity (one was a philosopher and writer, another primarily a writer and the third a political figure) and different countries and world-historical eras reflected the protest of the strata (including, and primarily, of the peasant masses) which were suffering from more or less considerable vestiges of the Middle Ages and from new, bourgeois oppression. Critical of the established bourgeois civilization, they cast doubt on both capitalist progress and the regularity of historical progress in general. Profoundly aware of the disintegration of

the age-old forms of community life, the decomposition of traditional social relations, the collapse of moral-ethical standards and other manifestations of the crisis of the old society under the influence of the spread of capitalist relations, Rousseau, Tolstoy and Gandhi sought the fulcrum of their social ideal in a patriarchal (or even primitive) communalism. And despite all this, each of them was in his own way bourgeois: Rousseau remaining within the general framework of the ideology of the Enlightenment, Tolstoy reflecting the "peasant bourgeois revolution" and Gandhi being the leader of a liberation movement headed by the bourgeoisie.

The essay on Gandhi is, as we can see, not only the result of the big path trodden by the author. Like the book as a whole, it confronts scholars with new problems, calls for reflection and points out new directions. "We may not agree with Gandhism, nor is it necessary," R.A. Ul'yanovskiy writes, concluding his essay, "but it is essential that we know and study it well and treat it with respect and as a significant and objective phenomenon in Indian history. Disagreement does not rule out respect" (p 77). I subscribe to the evaluation that has already been made of the significance of these propositions for a study of the ideology of the contemporary national liberation movement.¹¹ They are characteristic of the general tone of the book. The book teaches us to probe the phenomena being studied in depth and prevent oversimplification and the "pinning of labels" and teaches a respectful attitude toward the material of the research, even when it amounts to views with which the Marxist scholar largely cannot agree. This general tone, constructive-critical approach and creative character is what I see mainly as the significance of the book "Political Portraits of Fighters for National Independence".

FOOTNOTES

1. R.A. Ul'yanovskiy, "Ocherki natsional'no-osvoboditel'noy bor'by. Voprosy teorii i praktiki" [Studies in the National Liberation Struggle. Questions of Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1976; "Sovremennyye problemy Azii i Afriki. Politika. Ekonomika" [Contemporary Problems of Asia and Africa. Politics. Economics], Moscow, 1978.
2. "Bor'ba idey v sovremennom mire" [The Struggle of Ideas in the Modern World], vol 3, Moscow, 1978; Sovremennyy natsionalizm i obshchestvennoye razvitiye zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [Contemporary Nationalism and the Social Development of the Foreign East], Moscow, 1978; B.S. Yerasov, "Tropicheskaya Afrika: ideologiya i problemy kul'tury" [Tropical Africa: Ideology and Cultural Problems], Moscow, 1972; O.V. Martyshin, "Sotsializm i natsionalizm v Afrike" [Socialism and Nationalism in Africa], Moscow, 1972; V.G. Khoros, "Ideynyye techeniya narodnicheskogo tipa v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [Populist-Type Ideological Currents in the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1980; and others.
3. See A.V. Gordon, "Soviet Orientalists and Africanists on the Process of the Formation of National and Class Consciousness in the Emerging Countries (1976-1980)," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 1, 1981, pp 192-193.
4. R.A. Ul'yanovskiy, "Sotsializm i osvobodivshiesya strany" [Socialism and the Emerging Countries], Moscow, 1972.
5. See the box: NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 1, 1981, pp 184-190.

6. See A.V. Gordon, "Problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'noy bor'by v tvorchestve Frantsa Fanona" [Problems of the National Liberation Struggle in the Work of Franz Fanon], Moscow, 1977, pp 10-11, 51-52, 193-195.
7. See U. Roslavlev, "Gandizm" [Gandhism], Moscow-Leningrad, 1931.
8. M.K. Gandhi, "Moya zhizn'" [My Life], Moscow, 1934.
9. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 17, pp 210-211.
10. Ibid., vol 30, p 102.
11. N. Khokhlov, "Political Portraits," OKTYABR', No 10, 1980, p 223.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1981

8850

CS0: 1807/23

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH OAS MEMBERS DISCUSSED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 5-18

[Article by B.F. Martynov: "The Problems and Prospects of the Inter-American System"]

[Text] The end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's were marked by a quickening of the action of the mechanism of inter-American relations, a certain lowering of the level of confrontation in the OAS, and also by a growing endeavor by Washington to arrange its relations with other countries and regions of the developing world on the basis of "Pan-American" methods.

The ideology of Pan-Americanism was born in the first half of the 19th century, and its basis has invariably been comprised of the endeavor by the ruling circles of the United States to keep the Latin American region in the sphere of their economic, political, and military influence, assigning to it the role of a "strategic rear."

After World War II the political and economic paternalism of the United States with respect to the countries located south of the Rio Grande was supplemented by anti-communism. It is characteristic that already in those years the inter-American system had become a kind of proving ground on which Washington tested anti-communist doctrines for subsequent use in its global strategy. Thus, according to the words of the United States Secretary of State D.F. Dulles, the 1947 Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance ("The Rio de Janeiro Pact") was a "model for similar regional pacts in other areas of the world and, first of all, in Western Europe."¹

In 1948 the Organization of American States (OAS) whose charter reflected all of the basic points of the "Rio de Janeiro Pact" was created at a conference in Bogota. For a number of years so-called "anti-communist resolutions" were adopted in the OAS; the unseemly role of this organization with respect to the Guatemala revolution, the approval of American intervention in Panama and the Dominican Republic, and its support of Washington's anti-Cuban policy is well known. During the 1950's and 1960's attempts were repeatedly made by the United States to create so-called "inter-American armed forces" on a permanent basis (on the model of the

NAFO armed forces) which would have the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary movement in the countries of the continent. However, as the subsequent development of events showed, parallel with the increased complexity of the structure of the inter-American system, during this period the preconditions matured for a crisis in it which became a permanent characteristic of the system after the victory of the Cuban revolution and which made itself especially sharply felt at the beginning of the 1970's. The roots of this crisis are in the diverse interests and approaches of the United States and the Latin American states toward the basic goals of the inter-American system.

Until recently in the Soviet scholarly literature on the problems of the relations between the two Americas attention was devoted to the fact that the Latin American countries had been "drawn into" the inter-American system exclusively as a result of pressure from the United States. Now, especially in view of the tendencies of inter-American relations in the 1970's, interest is growing in the other side of the medal--in the circumstance that the Latin American states (above all, the largest of them--Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and also Columbia and Venezuela whose leadership has been taken over by the big bourgeoisie) have always wanted to see in the OAS an organ capable under specific conditions of strengthening their positions and, in particular, of assisting an acceleration of the economic development of the continent's countries.

Most of these states of the region nourished illusions (at least at the initial stage) about such principles which were declared in the OAS Charter as self-determination and non-intervention in internal affairs, which, at first glance, created obstacles to open intervention by the United States in the affairs of the Latin American republics. This kind of idealization of juridical norms was to a large extent connected with the euphoria about the "good neighbor" policy of F.D. Roosevelt which had not yet managed to finally lose its glitter during the first postwar years. "...The Bogota conference," noted, in particular, the well-known Mexican scholar M. Ojeda, "was regarded...as an important victory for Mexican diplomacy... since the United States had agreed to juridical equality, collective consultations, and the adoption of decisions by a majority of votes. However, it soon became clear that the enthusiasm was premature...."²

It is also characteristic that at this conference the delegations of Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and Uruguay put forward plans for improving inter-American trade and economic cooperation, while the delegate from Cuba submitted a proposal at the conference in Rio de Janeiro on the inclusion in the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance of a definition of economic aggression and on the development of effective measures against this kind of aggression.

With the passage of time and as a result of the failure of inter-American economic conferences and the refusal of the United States to regulate acute problems of trade and economic relations with Latin America, the groundlessness of the hopes of the Latin American bourgeoisie to transform the inter-American system into an instrument of "cooperation" between the two Americas became obvious. The failure to realize the program of the "Alliance for Progress" delivered the most serious blow to these hopes.

For this reason, the process of the struggle to reorganize the inter-American system which was begun in 1973 on the initiative of the Latin American states is completely understandable. In contrast to the first reform which ended in 1967 with a modification of certain points of the 1948 OAS Charter, the new reform was supposed to embrace not only the Charter, but also the economic, political, and military principles of the inter-American system. For the first time in the history of the inter-American system the question was put on the OAS agenda of reforming the "Rio de Janeiro Pact," the 1948 Inter-American Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and the Charter of the Inter-American Bank for Development. In evidence was an endeavor by most of the Latin American countries to put an end to the military and political thrust of the system and to strengthen its role in solving trade and economic problems.

Thus, the 1970's became a qualitatively new stage in the history of inter-American relations, a fact which was connected with the emergence onto the surface of the deep contradictions which were set in the OAS from the moment of its founding.

The peace-loving policy of the USSR on the international arena which promoted the beginning of the process of detente between the West and the East, and the anti-imperialist tendencies in the foreign policy of a number of countries of Latin America (especially the activities of the government of People's Unity of Chile) created in the early 1970's real preconditions for progressive transformations in the inter-American system. In addition, the final shift of the levers of state control to the class of the industrial bourgeoisie in most of the Latin American countries strengthened the bourgeois reformist tendencies in their policies and determined the fact that the demand for a comprehensive reorganization of inter-American relations was supported by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Ecuador. However, during the course of the struggle for the reorganization of the system the United States, basing itself on the support of right-wing authoritarian regimes, made maximum efforts to prevent a review of the fundamentals of pan-Americanism. "The participation by the United States in the discussion of the questions concerning the reorganization of the OAS was negligible," the American scholars J. Theberge and R. Fontaine note. "The chief task of the United States consisted in preventing the adoption of reforms which would infringe upon its interests in this organization."³

Guiding itself by such aspirations, in June 1976 Washington officially rejected documents which had been worked out by a special commission and approved by the OAS Permanent Council--a protocol on reforming the OAS Charter and draft conventions on cooperation for the purpose of development and on collective economic security, --while the only document which was signed by all of the representatives of the member countries at a conference in San Jose in 1975--the "San Jose Protocol"⁴--has still not gone into effect because not all of the states have ratified it.

As for the principle of "collective economic security," the specific nature of this initiative which fully corresponds with the aspirations of the states of the region to establish a new international economic order was determined by the character of the relations which developed historically in the inter-American system. As was noted by F. Cannon, the former special advisor to the General Secretary of the OAS, "the basis of the process of reorganization was the intention to give re-

gional economic security an importance parallel to the importance of regional political security."⁵ The principle of "collective economic security" was put forward by Peru and supported by the majority of Latin American states which are attempting to create real guarantees of protection against economic aggression.

However, the United States representatives opposed the fixing of propositions on "collective economic security" in the documents of the inter-American system. They also came out against the adoption of special conventions on collective economic security and cooperation for the purpose of development. The ruling circles of the United States did not want to come into conflict with the prospect of the adoption of any, albeit purely formal, sanctions for one-sided actions which damaged the economies of the Latin American countries and to answer for the undermining activities of trans-Atlantic corporations on the continent.

Beginning with the middle 1970's the United States began to make efforts to "brain wash" the ruling circles of the states of the region and, first of all, the reform-minded bourgeoisie in order to direct the plans for the reform of inter-American economic relations which were being put forward by them into a channel which did not contradict the interests of the United States. And these efforts produced definite results. In particular, the "La Paz Declaration" which was adopted at the IX Session of the OAS General Assembly on the initiative of the countries of the Andes Group was characterized by a marked muffling of the emphasis on inter-American trade and economic contradictions. In contrast to all of the previous final resolutions of the OAS General Assembly on the questions of cooperation, the "La Paz Declaration" did not contain any mention of "collective economic security." It limited itself solely to a call to "refrain from measures which could hinder the economic and social development of the member countries." The absence in this document of any mention of the convention which had been so actively advanced by the diplomacy of the Latin American countries testified to a further "slide" by the national-reformist circles of the continent to compromise positions in relations with the United States.

The development of inter-American relations during the last decade has convincingly demonstrated that in order to preserve the foundations of capitalist production relations in the countries of the region the United States was compelled, on the one hand, to take account of the growing economic potential and political importance of the Latin American states and, on the other, to assist the development in them of state monopoly capitalism based on local bourgeois reformists circles.

At the end of the 1970's the United States embarked in earnest upon the creation in the Western Hemisphere of a new "modernized" system of dependence capable of keeping the status of the region in the sphere of American influence for the longest possible period.

Persistent calls by "political realists"--a group of influential scholars, politicians, and businessmen who were joined together in the "Linowitz Committee" -- developed in the middle 1970's into a discussion of the problems of Latin American policy in the United States Congress and resulted in a number of corrections in Washington's foreign policy. The committee's statement that "military security

must not be an end in itself and the guiding principle of American policy because in the next few years problems of an economic character will take on practical importance"⁶ reflected a greater consideration of the objective reality which had taken shape in international relations in the Western Hemisphere toward the middle of the 1970's (although the practical policies of the United States in the region, especially the present course of the Reagan Administration had gravitated through inertia toward the traditional methods).

In putting forth a proposal for a "new Latin American course" Washington politicians did not conceal the fact that its paramount aim was to keep and permanently fix Latin America in the world capitalist system.

One of the means chosen by the United States for this purpose was a shift to the development of relations with Latin American countries on a bilateral basis which had already been begun during the period of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. This "selective" approach was dictated by an endeavor to undermine the developing unity of the Latin American countries, to oppose one group of states to another, and to sow discord among the Latin American partners of the United States. The well-known American scholar R. Roet had noted: "With a multilateral approach to the examination of such questions as the activities of the multi-national corporations or the transfer of technology we frequently clash head-on with a united grouping of Latin American countries."⁷ The rejection by the United States of a multilateral approach was proclaimed as official Washington policy in the first public speech by President Jimmy Carter on Latin American questions on 14 April 1977 in the OAS Permanent Council. Subsequently the countries and sub-regions with which Washington intended to develop relations in the first place were defined in the American Congress. They were Mexico, a number of countries in the Andes Pact and the Caribbean Basin, and Brazil and Argentina.⁸

As for the OAS, speaking at the Seventh Session of the OAS General Assembly which took place in June 1977 on the Island of Grenada the then United States Secretary of State C. Vance confirmed Washington's intention to reject the drafts which had been worked out of reforms of the inter-American documents.

In the opinion of many Latin American observers, the statements by American representatives who repeatedly called for the elimination of "formalism" and "bureaucracy" in the OAS "expressed the irritation which the United States had begun to feel with its own creature and its growing distrust of this organization as the interest in it of the Latin American states grew."⁹

Against this background, the decision adopted by the United States in 1978 to decrease its contribution to the OAS budget from 66 to 49 percent was understandable. However, even before the adoption of this decision Washington had taken to decreasing its financing of OAS activities. Matters went so far that at a meeting of the International Council on Education, Science, and Culture which took place in San Salvador in 1976 the OAS General Secretary A. Orrila accused the United States of trying to "undermine the idea of regional integration"¹⁰ since it was decreasing its annual contribution to the budget of this council by four million dollars.

However, the shift by Washington from multilateral to bilateral diplomacy did not in fact mean that the United States had given up its attempt to maintain OAS as an instrument for achieving its goals. Parallel with a sham "loss of interest" in this organization behind which there was actually concealed some poorly camouflaged blackmail, during this same period the United States made maximum efforts to activate those agencies of the inter-American system which could promote the pursuit of its Latin American policy, for example, the OAS Secretariat and also the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which was "switched in" by Washington to its propagandistic campaign in "defense of human rights."

Weakening those agencies of the inter-American system in whose activities the United States was not interested, and strengthening those which could promote a revival of Pan-Americanism under contemporary conditions, Washington, as C. Vance stated, was trying to "unite the Western Hemisphere on the basis of the common values which existed in the United States and the Latin American countries."¹¹ At the same time, by proclaiming a "selective approach" to certain countries of the region, the United States was attempting to turn them into its active supporters in the inter-American system and to prepare the conditions for the creation under the control of the United States of a block of states able to play the role of an "obedient majority" in OAS.

Thus, Washington took a number of steps during this period aimed at increasing the influence of the countries of the Caribbean Basin in the organization. The place for holding the VII Session of the OAS General Assembly in 1977 was chosen to be St. George's--the capital of Grenada which not long before that had joined the OAS. Besides the purely propaganda effect--a demonstration of the "concern" of OAS for the needs of small states, --the holding of the session on Grenada was supposed to, according to American calculations, politically strengthen the anti-popular regime of A. Gairy who was then in power on the island and who adhered to a pro-American orientation. The election at the IX Session of the OAS General Assembly in 1979 of the representative of Barbados V. Mak-Komi to the post of deputy general secretary was actively supported by the United States and was, according to the State Department official F. Habib, "new evidence confirming the increased importance of the countries of the Caribbean Basin."¹²

An analogous approach was characteristic also for the states of the Andes Pact. "The United States," the former Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs K.J. Bedoja had observed, "discovered for themselves the extraordinary importance of the countries of the Andes Pact.... It understood that the new importance which was being acquired by the Andes countries would help them to play an important role in inter-American relations, and, therefore, the United States strove to coordinate its actions with those of the Andes countries."¹³ In particular, for this purpose in 1979 the United States annulled the discriminatory articles of its 1974 trade law which excluded Venezuela and Ecuador from the system of general United States preferences.¹⁴

At the VIII, IX, and X Sessions of the OAS General Assembly a number of Latin American states continued to express at times very sharp criticism of United States economic policy in the Western Hemisphere. There developed among the Latin American delegates a dissatisfaction with the endeavor by the White House to look upon

the political rights of man in isolation from social and economic rights. The change in the priorities of United States foreign policy, it was noted at the VIII Session of the General Assembly of the OAS by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia I. Llevano Agirre, must not hinder the elimination of the instability in inter-American relations which was engendered by the economic inequality of the two Americas.¹⁵

At the VIII and IX Sessions the representatives of Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Brazil, and other states again spoke out in favor of renewing the work to reorganize the inter-American system. "The lack of progress in the matter of reform is a result of the fact that the United States is refusing to accept the propositions on collective security and on the sovereignty of states over their natural resources," the delegate from Panama stated at the VIII Session of the OAS General Assembly. The fact that this question was not touched upon at the last X Session can be explained by the fact that on the eve of the session the OAS Permanent Council adopted a decision to hold at the end of 1981 a special session of the OAS General Assembly on the questions of economic cooperation and development.

In July 1980 a commission of experts at OAS whose membership consisted of such well-known economists as F. Errera (chairman), Walt Rostow, Nikolas Ardita Bartletta, Gerd Rosenthal, and others prepared a report "Cooperation and the Integrated Development of the Countries of the Western Hemisphere"¹⁷ which was supposed to figure as the basic document at the forthcoming special session. This document which devotes its paramount attention to global economic problems--energy, food, and others--differs in an essential way from the memorandum which was spread about by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Colombia and Costa Rica at the VI Session of the OAS General Assembly in 1976 and included in the resolution on the convocation of a special session. In particular, the report raised the question of the introduction by the United States of trade preferences for these states of Latin America on the type of the Lome convention between the European Economic Community and a number of developing states. However, the priority of global problems over "purely" regional ones which had already been announced by President Jimmy Carter provides grounds for believing that the United States is continuing to oppose the establishment of any kind of regional system of preferences in trade with Latin America and, in general, does not intend to solve the critical problems of inter-American trade and economic relations.

During the last year of the Carter Administration's power, there appeared signs of another "hardening" of the policy of the United States in Latin America and of a return to the "traditional" methods of domination. At the X Session of the OAS General Assembly Jimmy Carter stated that the "struggle of the Salvadorian people (Carter meant the Junta) is also our struggle." At the session the United States again raised the question of "international terrorism." In the OAS Permanent Council where this question was discussed Washington in fact supported the "hard" position of such states as Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Guatemala. Nicaragua, Peru, and Jamaica condemned the return by the OAS to an examination of repressive measures in the "struggle against terrorism" by which was meant the liberation movement. According to the newspaper EL TIEMPO, the representative of Nicaragua left the meeting hall of the OAS Permanent Council stating that "for 50 years Nicaragua has existed under terror."¹⁸

In essence, Carter prepared the soil for his successor whose policy in Latin America had been a logical continuation of the policy of the Democratic Administration at the end of its rule.

From the first days of its accession to power the Reagan government began attempts to revive the "Monroe Doctrine" in the Western Hemisphere, and imperial ambitions predominated in United States policy on the international arena.

The White House's plans with respect to the Latin American states were defined before Reagan officially took the post of President in a report on the future policy of the Republican Administration in Latin America. It made provision, in particular, for a "revival" of the OAS and of the entire inter-American system in accordance with the traditional models and for the defense of anti-communist agreements on the "security" of the Western Hemisphere on the basis of the "Rio de Janeiro Pact" or of new "security" agreements; it planned a "harder line" toward Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, the renewal of the military and economic might of dictatorial regimes, and rejection of the use of the "defense of human rights" slogan in the OAS and its replacement by the "fight against international terrorism" slogan, and an intensification of efforts to create a South Atlantic Treaty Pact.

The practical steps of the new Washington Administration show that the recommendations contained in the report have been put at the basis of White House policy. Commenting on the speech by R. Reagan to the Canadian Parliament in March 1981, the French newspaper LE MONDE noted that it was an attempt to "impress upon all of the inhabitants of the continent from the Baffin land to Patagonia that, despite differences in culture, religion, and language and despite the huge gap between levels of development, they, nevertheless, make up a single community."¹⁹ The entire speech was permeated with ideas concerning the "defense of the inviolability of the Western Hemisphere," and this, as was then emphasized, "inevitably leads to the thought of the rebirth of the notorious "Monroe Doctrine."²⁰

The appointment of J. Middelhoff who occupied the post of Secretary of Navy in the Ford Administration and headed the Reagan "transitional group" in the CIA to the post of permanent United States representative at OAS is regarded by many political observers as a prologue to the conducting in the OAS of a wide campaign against "international terrorism." At the same time, the United States is continuing its course aimed at reducing the social and economic activities of this organization. The participants in the annual session of the Inter-American Council on Education, Science, and Culture which completed its work on 10 July 1981 in Buenos Aires again censured Washington for refusing to support the accomplishment of a program in the field of education.

Washington has hastened to improve relations with its traditional allies--military dictatorship regimes. All limitations on military assistance to dictatorial regimes were abolished by a special directive of President Reagan. In July 1981 the United States government decided that it would not for reasons of the "protection of human rights" abstain or vote against the granting by international banks of loans to Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

speaking on 4 June 1981 to the "Council of the Americas" (of which the largest American corporations which have capital investments in Latin America are members), the United States Vice-President G. Bush again stated the "right" of the United States to "protect its interests" in Latin America. He confirms that the principle of American policy in this region is "collective defense against aggression." In his speech G. Bush repeatedly referred to the "threat" to the region from Cuba and Nicaragua, thereby trying to justify Washington's interventionist policy.

As if summarizing some preliminary results of United States Latin American policy, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs V. Vaky warns that "the Reagan Administration is capable of properly evaluating its own power, but it is also capable of overestimating the necessity for its use in concrete situations, which could lead to the emergence of a serious contradiction between the requirements of an intelligent foreign policy and the needs of domestic political life."²¹

The idea of creating a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) is not being left without attention in Washington. According to press reports, during the visit to the United States by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Botha plans were discussed for putting together this block in which a leading role would be assigned to the South African Republic. In addition to the South African Republic being in SATO which is to be created on the model of NATO, the White House is striving to bring in certain countries of the Southern Cone. At the end of May 1981 specialists on strategic problems from the United States, the South African Republic, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay met in Buenos Aires with the purpose of discussing plans for the creation of SATO.

The head of the Chilean Junta Pinochet has also offered his services, putting forward an "initiative" to conclude a special "Southern Cone Defense Treaty" with the participation of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. However, plans of this kind are not meeting with wide support in Latin America. Speaking in Lima in June 1981, the President of Brazil J. Figueiredo rejected the possibility of concluding such a treaty.²²

The United States initiative in the economic development of the countries of the Caribbean Basin and of Central America which is being called a "Marshall Mini-Plan" was, according to the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES, an expression of "concern about communist influence in this region."²³ Presented by many American political observers as almost nothing less than a "change in the attitude of the Reagan government toward the region," this plan, from all appearances, has the purpose of showing that the "United States is interested in the fight against communism not only by military means."²⁴

A conference which was held on 13 June 1981 in Nassau (Bahama Islands) in which the United States Secretary of State and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Venezuela, and Canada participated did not work out any concrete measures regarding the provision of assistance to the countries of the Caribbean Basin and Central America and limited itself to a statement regarding the "freedom of action" of each of the participants in this matter. At the same time, attention should be given to the position of Mexico which rightly saw in the American plan

hegemonist aspirations with regard to the countries of Central America and the Caribbean Basin and set as a condition for its participation in the conference a rejection by Washington of the inclusion of military components in the plan, of giving it an anti-communist thrust, and of discriminatory practices against aid-receiving countries for any political reasons whatsoever. These conditions which were put forward by the President of Mexico J. Lopez Portillo during his two-day visit to Washington in June 1981 are now especially important in the light of the undeclared war which is being waged by the United States against the people of El Salvador, its hostility to Nicaragua, and its attempts to overthrow the government of Grenada.

The fact that the plan for "assistance" to the countries of the Caribbean Basin is supposed to be carried out outside of the framework of OAS, on a, so to speak, "informal" basis, once again testifies to the endeavor by the United States to organize "cooperation" on a more narrow, sub-regional or bilateral level and to enlist the support of new allies.

Even before Reagan had officially taken the post of the Presidency, R. Fontaine, an advisor to the President on inter-American affairs, confirmed that in relations with the Latin American countries the emphasis would be put on "confidential" diplomacy and closer relations with the leading states of the continent--Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.²⁵

American diplomacy had been compelled to show its greatest activeness in its relations with Mexico in view of the substantial stocks of petroleum in that country and of other factors. At the present time the White House is seeking measures which could bring the two states "closer together" either by means of the creation for Mexico of especially preferential conditions, or by means of a "division of responsibility" within the planned "North American Common Market" consisting of the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

Mexico was the first country which Reagan visited without waiting for his official accession to the post of President.

The policy of the Reagan Administration in Latin America bears witness to the fact that contemporary Pan-Americanism as a doctrine which is being used by the United States to justify its "special responsibility" for the fate of Latin America is a combination of two forms of dependency: the old--military political, and a new one--financial and technological. In this connection, the temporary "loss of interest" by Washington in OAS in the 1970's was no more than a maneuver aimed at winning time and preventing the reorganization of the inter-American system in the interests of the Latin American countries.

In the 1980's Washington again considered it possible to openly return to the methods of "traditional" Pan-Americanism.

American political pundits do not conceal the fact that they again wished to see in OAS an obedient implement in the hands of Washington. Thus, for example, R. Bloomfield, stating that the United States has "special rights" in the Western

Hemisphere, foresees the possibility of contradictions between the United States and the Latin American countries in OAS; however, these contradictions must be, in his opinion, removed by means of the use of force--"if not the force of arms, then at least the force of economic reprisals and political ostracism." Moreover, in complete correspondence with the American tactic of partial economic concessions in exchange for concessions of a political character, he proposes that the Latin Americans "give up their global ideological conceptions in favor of purely practical solutions."²⁶

It is obvious that this variant of the development of the inter-American system will contradict the interests of Latin America which does not wish to unquestioningly submit to American political and economic pressure. I believe that not only certain results which have already been achieved by the countries of the region during the struggle for a reform of inter-American relations, but also the new correlation of forces in the OAS testifies to the fact that the possibilities for the use of this organization by the United States have become greatly narrowed.

As the experience of the last decade shows, the question of a radical reorganization of the inter-American organization which was for a certain time put in the background will again occupy, to all appearances, a dominating place on the OAS agenda. On a number of critical questions of a socio-economic and also of a political character the Latin American republics will more than once be giving the United States "battle" in this organization and will gain successes.

Washington is at the present time admitting the possibility of expanding OAS by means of granting full membership rights to its "permanent observers" --Canada, the countries of Western Europe, and Japan. As J. Theberge and R. Fontaine believe, the future of the inter-American system depends upon "how effectively it will be possible to adapt the OAS to the growing global interests of Latin America by means of opening the doors for extra-regional states."²⁷ An increase in the number of members of the Inter-American Bank for Development on the basis of a number of capitalist countries of Europe and Asia encountered a favorable reaction in the United States because, as J. Atkins observes, it made it possible to lower the level of one-sided influence on the affairs of the bank, which was being opposed by the Latin Americans, and, on the other hand, to tie the countries of the region even more closely to the capitalistic economic system.²⁸

Taking note of the complexity of current inter-American relations, the General Secretary of the OAS A. Orfila has stated that in the 1980's "the American States will again be at one of the decisive stages of their history. They are sure of the necessity for the modernization of their regional relations, including a search for a new development strategy."²⁹

The objective character of inter-American contradictions which had already revealed itself during the epoch of the creation of the first Pan-American agencies provides weighty grounds for believing that an intensification of the financial and technological and military and political dependence of the Latin American countries upon imperialism will only deepen and radicalize the struggle of the peoples of Latin America for a rejection of all forms of Pan-Americanism. Critical use will be made in this struggle of the experience of the 1970's.

It is clear that a victory by the progressive, democratic forces in a number of states can give a new impetus to the struggle for a fundamental reform of inter-American relations and bring about a new qualitative progressive change in the political situation in the Western Hemisphere.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Documents of Inter-American Cooperation 1881-1948," Vol. 2, Philadelphia, 1955, p 178.
2. M. Ojeda, "Alcances y límites de la política exterior de Mexico," Mexico, 1976, p 52.
3. J. Theberge and R. Fontaine, "Latin America. Struggle for Progress," Lexington Books, 1977, p 58.
4. For more details see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No. 4, 1978, pp 216-224.
5. "Americas," No. 1, Washington 1980, p 40.
6. "The Americas in the Changing World," A Report of the Commission on U.S.-Latin American relations. New York, 1975, p 11.
7. Ibid, p 110.
8. "Latin America. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate 95 Congress, II Session, Oct. 4, 5 and 6," Washington, 1979, pp 23, 137.
9. OPINIAO, Rio de Janeiro, 21 March 1975.
10. EXCELSIOR, Mexico, 29 Jan. 1976.
11. Current Policy, N105. United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington, Oct. 23, 1979, p 3.
12. V.F. Habib, "U.S. Relations with the Caribbean and Central America," Current Policy, N117. United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington, Nov. 28, 1979, p 6.
13. EL CONERCIO, Lima, 29 Oct. 1979.
14. For more details about United States relations with the countries of the Andes Group, see: V.P. Sudarev, "Foreign Political Aspects of Andes Integration," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No. 6, 1981.
15. EL TIEMPO, Bogota, 30 June 1978.
16. EL DIA, Mexico, 30 June 1978.

17. See: OAS Report. OAS/SER TII, GTC/15-80, Aug. 6, 1980.
18. EL TIEMPO, 21 March 1980.
19. LE MONDE, Paris, 14 March 1981.
20. Ibid.
21. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, 1981, Vol. 59, pp 646-647.
22. EL DIARIO, Lima, 29 June 1981.
23. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 May 1981.
24. THE WASHINGTON POST, 30 May 1981.
25. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 5 Oct. 1980.
26. "The Future of the Inter-American System," New York, 1979, pp 14, 18.
27. J. Theberge and R. Fontaine, op. cit., p 60.
28. G. Atkins, "Latin America in the International Political System," New York-London, 1977, p 345.
29. "Americas," N4, 1980, p 3.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," "Latinskaya Amerika," 1981

2959

CSO: 1807/29

MIKOYAN ATTACKS U.S. TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 74-77

[Article by S.A. Mikoyan: "Terror: From Bolivar to Torrijos?"]

[Text] ...On 24 May 1981 an airplane with the president of Ecuador Jaime Roldos Aguilera on board crashed, tearing into a mountain.

...On 31 July 1981 an airplane in which the Commander-In-Chief of the National Guard of Panama General Omar Torrijos was flying crashed into a mountain.

Thus, over a period of two months two accidents occurred in Latin America which were capable of changing the political map of that continent. And a little bit earlier, but also in an air crash, the Commander of the Armed Forces of Peru General Jose Ojos also perished.

If one follows the unabridged dictionaries, the word "accident" signifies an unforeseen occurrence which takes place without anybody's design and without any visual causal connection and which changes the normal course of events.

Of course, no one is able to prove today that the above accidents do not come under these definitions. "He who wishes to accuse does not have the right to hurry" -- said Moliere. But someone's participation, someone's intention, and causal connection do not always become clear right away. At one time it was believed absolutely impossible to prove that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a conspiracy; it was officially stated that it was the unmotivated act of a single person and for this reason almost an "accident." Today, probably even American school children do not believe in this version.

The court of history is more important and more just than a court of jurors. The latter needs material proof and irrefutable evidence. But if this is prudently not left behind, or concealed, or fabricated, thus casting a shadow upon others, the murderers remain unpunished, although the entire world points its finger at them.

A Latin proverb says: "Is fecit cui prodest" ("It was done by he who profited from it"). Incidentally, every investigator who tries to discover the guilty party for a crime proceeds from this assumption.

Well, who then--if such exists--is guilty of these tragic events?

Even the most superficial study of the history of Latin America reveals that the forces of reaction have often solved or tried to solve their problems by means of terror, both individual and mass. This sad tradition can probably be traced back to that cold night in September 1828 when Simon Bolivar saved himself by a miracle from the deadly blows of sabres by jumping off a balcony and hiding under the bridge over which the detachment of unluckily murderers was galloping.

A century and a half has passed since that time. The closer we come to the present day, the more frequent and the more clear in this history of political terrorism is the role of the intelligence service of the United States of America. Even before the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, Augusto Sesar Sandino was murdered on assignment from Washington. After World War II this practice began to be employed not simply shamelessly, but in a planned and "centralized" manner, as is demanded by the name Central Intelligence Agency.

Sometimes this method was even used to get rid of reactionary dictators who had outlived their time and were getting in the way: let us recall the elimination of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. But this is an exception. The basic and invariable goal of CIA terrorism in Latin America is the physical elimination of the leaders of the liberation movement. Today we know even from the official documents of the United States Congress about a long list of carefully worked out attempts on the life of Fidel Castro. Knowledge is also available about a number of unsuccessful attempts on the life of General Torrijos.

The CIA has its trump cards in the "secret war" against progressive forces in Latin America. The most important of them is the existence of well organized inter-state cooperation by the repressive apparatuses of most of the countries of the continent and, above all, of its Southern cone. It is possible and, no doubt, more advantageous to do dirty deeds with someone else's hands. Especially in the area of mass terror. For example, whereas in the past it was necessary to land the marines and shoot thousands of people in a single day, today a similar result is achieved not as rapidly but just as effectively. The Guatemalan murderers from the "Hano Blanca," the Brazilian executioners from the "Death Squads" and their Argentine colleagues from the "AAA" organization ("Anti-Communist Alliance of Argentina") own the "patent" for the invention of the sophisticated methodology of secret kidnappings and murders. This methodology was then adopted into the arsenal of the ruling circles of a number of other states in the region. Its employment on a wide scale over many years has proven in our time to be the basic direction of mass political terrorism in Latin America. Such odious actions as the shooting down at a single time of thousands of people such as occurred on the banana plantations of Columbia in 1928 and is so memorably described by Gabriel Garcia Marquez in the novel "One Hundred Years of Loneliness" have become unnecessary.

Today individual, "national" elements of the inter-American intelligence and repressive apparatus are already showing their own initiative and sometimes taking upon themselves things which for certain reasons are not ventured upon--or not "okayed" by the political leadership--by the United States special services. This applies especially to the organization of coups in small countries or to the elimination of various individuals by various means.

The forces of reaction understand the enormous role that is played in the liberation movement of the developing world by individual personalities. From this phenomenon very pragmatic conclusions are drawn: to eliminate popular and "dangerous" leaders. It cannot be denied that this approach sometimes yields dividends to the masters of dirty business. Indeed, the murder of Sandino, for example, put Nicaragua for 45 years into the hands of the Somoza dynasty which faithfully served the interests of the United States. The murder of Gaitan and many of his followers not only became the beginning of the subsequent "violence," but also determined the fate of Columbia for at least two decades. Therefore, the sending of murderers to Fidel Castro and the organization of the operation to surround and murder Ernesto Che Guevara were supposed, according to the design of the "brain centers" of terror, to halt or even throw back the wave of the revolutionary tide in the Western Hemisphere in the 1960's and 1970's.

During the current period the struggle between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction has become sharper in Latin America. The tactic of terror is the basic weapon in the latter's arsenal. Until now it has been used in countries where the struggle has reached a culmination. Such was the situation in the 1960's in Brazil and Guatemala, in the 1970's in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Nicaragua, and again Guatemala, and in the 1980's the addition of Bolivia and El Salvador....

But there are also on the continent countries with a more or less stable domestic situation, with bourgeois democratic regimes, which with their solidarity with the revolutionaries give rise to hatred in the Latin American "guerrillas" and their protectors. The regime of President Jaime Roldos Aguilera in Ecuador and the regime in Panama upon which the Commander and Chief of the National Guard General Omar Torrijos had a decisive influence were precisely such countries. In Peru General Jose Ojeda was the last of the actors of the 1968 "military revolution" who still remained in a key government post. He was in no way suited for the role of an accomplice of Pinochet, a supporter of "AAA," or an enthusiastic student of the philippics of Alexander Haig.

On the South American continent Roldos in recent years remained the most radically and patriotically minded president. With many neighboring regimes sliding to the right and in an atmosphere of the truly hysterically anti-communist policy of the new United States Administration which gave every encouragement to those who have long been censured by all people with any decency at all, the president of Ecuador stood out clearly. In some people he called forth enormous respect, while in others he caused unconcealed irritation.

General Omar Torrijos is undoubtedly one of the most vivid figures in the history of Latin America in this century. A cadet at military schools under the wardship of the Pentagon, a commander who is sent to put down peasant and student disturbances, and, finally, a general who turned his thoughts and feelings to the interests and hopes of his people and of the peoples of neighboring countries, who delivered painful defeats to United States imperialism, and who materially transformed the entire situation in Central America.

The many years of struggle by Torrijos against United States dominion in the Panama Canal Zone and its unlimited control over the canal itself, his consistent and unchanging cooperation and mutual understanding with revolutionary Cuba, and his

help to the Nicaraguan rebels--all of this and much else compels us to remember over and over again the Latin proverb cited above.

It comes especially to mind if one considers that--and today this is perhaps the most important thing--Roldos and Torrijos occupied, as does the President of Mexico Jose Lopez Portillo, an identical position in the El Salvador question. It has to be kept in mind that this is the neurological center of the present stage of the struggle by the forces of imperialism and extreme reaction against the forces of progress and democracy, that point of the globe where it has been decided to demonstrate how a revolution should be "thrown back." They actively supported the line of a political settlement in that country. But now the local counter-revolution has received the complete approval of its North American protector for the course which has been adopted by the "guerrillas" of a "military solution of the question," that is, drowning the people's indignation in blood. Roldos and Torrijos hindered the carrying out of this course, and hand in hand with Lopez Portillo they gave active moral and political support to the Salvadoran patriots.

The epidemic of political terrorism in today's postwar "civilized" era in the history of humanity is not only not disappearing, but is spreading like a blot over every continent. If the Medici used poison, and the Inquisition bonfires, if the "Long Knives" were used against the Huguenots, and poisoned bullets against Lenin, and if Marat fell from dagger blows and Juarez from revolver shots, in our "age of enlightenment," in the age of the achievements of modern science and technology the arsenal of the murderers has been replenished, modified, and perfected. Optic sights, silencers, plastic bombs or remote-control bombs, poisons which are dusted from the air over "enemy territory," or underwater swimming suits which are treated with poisons--all of this makes murders and the murderers themselves more difficult to recognize, less obvious, covered over sometimes by a mist of uncertainty or doubt. Nevertheless, political terrorism, both mass and individual, has remained a serious sickness of mankind which is more stable and adaptable to changing conditions than the plague or small pox.

The list of victims of individual terror by the forces of extreme reaction and obscurantism on all latitudes and continents in the life of a single generation is endless. "Accidents" and "accidental" shots put an end to the lives of presidents and generals, clergymen and revolutionaries, military men and civilians, and political and public figures of the most varied convictions--from communists to liberals or even sober minded conservatives. This list includes Sandino and Ghandi, Gaitan and Patrice Lumumba, the Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King, Amilkar Kabral and Che Guevara, Aldo Moro and Orlando Letelier, Carlo Prats and Juan Jose Torrez, Archbishop Romero and Uberto Alvarado....

As for the current political terrorism in the Western Hemisphere, one has to believe that someday the archives of the secret services of some country or the confessions of some people (who managed to survive as witnesses or performers) will throw light on many "accidents" and "actions by people acting alone." Then, perhaps, the purely juridical evidence will appear which will help a court of jurors to confirm the verdict of history.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," "Latinskaya Amerika," 1981

2959

CSO: 1807/29

TAJIK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES DESCRIBED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, 1981 pp 137-143

[Article by D. S. Saidmuradov: "The Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies"]

[Text] Tajik oriental studies have a long and rich history. Throughout their existence the Tajik people have entered into contacts with neighboring countries and also with more distant peoples. This has contributed to the gradual accumulation in the Tajiks' spiritual culture of rich and sometimes unique material on the history and culture of the surrounding countries and peoples which is reflected in Tajik-Persian historiography, the start and flourishing of which go back to the IX-X centuries of our era. The historians, geographers, prose writers and poets of that time--abu-ja'far Muhammad ibn-Jarir al-Tabari, Abu Ali ibn Abu-l Fazl Muhammad al-Bal'ami, Narsahi, Abu Abdullah Abulhasan Ja'far ibn Muhammad Rudaki, Abul Qasim Firdausi and many others--included in their works on the history and culture of the Tajik people a vast amount of material on other countries and peoples, particularly Iran, Afghanistan, India, the Arab countries and so forth, also. The historiography of subsequent centuries and the works of Ata-Malik Juwaynir, Sharaf ad-din Ali Yazdi, Abd ar-Razak as-Samarvandi, Hafiz Abru, Mirkhond and many others, right up to Mirza Azim Sami, a historian of the XIX century, reflect the history of the Arab Caliphate, the Hindustan peninsula, the Seljuks, Mongols and other Turkic tribes.

The colophons of Tajik medieval manuscripts--notes in the margins briefly recording historical events through the eyes of contemporaries and eyewitnesses and also a wealth of Tajik epigraphy--are an important supplement to historiography. A large number of Greek, Sogdian and Arabic inscriptions has been preserved on the territory of Tajikistan. Much of the material contains archaeological discoveries and inscriptions on the stones.

A big contribution to the conception and development of oriental studies in Tajikistan was made by outstanding Russian and Soviet orientalists, particularly V.V. Bartol'd, A.A. Semenov, S.F. Ol'denburg, M.S. Andreyev, Ye.E. Bertel's and others.

Organized Tajik oriental studies were initiated by the creation in 1932 of a center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was reorganized in 1941 into a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences and in 1951 into the Tajik Academy of Sciences, to whose charge in 1953 were transferred all the manuscripts housed in various

establishments of the republic. The Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Department of Oriental Studies and the Written Heritage was created in 1958 on the basis of the Sector of Tajik Classical Literature and Oriental Manuscripts of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Language and Literature. It was given the task of a comprehensive study of the history, cultural history, literature and language and also of urgent socioeconomic problems of the developing countries of the Near and Middle East (Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and the Arab countries). The material basis for scientific research was the collection of oriental manuscripts of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences, which had been transferred to the Department for Custody and Scientific Processing.

Three sectors--the Contemporary Orient, Textual Criticism and Publication and Oriental Manuscripts--functioned in the first years of activity in the department, and the Countries of the Arab East, Iran, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan sectors were created as the result of further reorganizations.

A great deal of work was done in the time of the department's existence (1958-1970) which was embodied in monographs, works of textual criticism and collections, among which were the "Selected Works" of Abd-ur-rahman Jami in five volumes (Dushanbe, 1964), the "Selected Works" of [Amir Khisraf Dekhlavi] (Dushanbe, 1971-1975), Abul Qasim Firdausi's "Shah Namah" in nine volumes (Dushanbe, 1964-1966), Catalogues of Oriental Manuscripts of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences in five volumes (Dushanbe, 1960-1974), the Alphabetical Catalogue of Manuscripts Discovered in the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Autonomous Oblast by the 1959-1963 A.Ye. Bertel's and M. Bakoyev Expedition (Moscow, 1967) and others.

The successful development of oriental studies in the republic, the growth of national orientalist personnel, the broadening of the range of problems of scientific research in the sphere of oriental studies and the strengthening of the material base prepared the ground for the creation in the republic of the Institute of Oriental Studies. In accordance with a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Science and Technology and a decision of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, the TaSSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies was created in 1970. Oriental research in Tajikistan is also conducted in other scientific establishments of the Academy of Sciences and also in the Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin, the Dushanbe State Pedagogical Institute imeni T.G. Shevchenko and elsewhere. The Institute of Oriental Studies has become the center of oriental research and its coordination in the republic.

The institute currently consists of two departments: Socioeconomic and Political-Religious Problems of the Near and Middle East Countries; and Study of Manuscripts and Monuments of Written Culture and the sectors: Iran and Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, Arabic Studies, Textual Criticism, Custody and Primary Processing of Manuscripts and Maintenance and Scientific Description of Manuscripts, Catalogues and Facsimile Publications and Monuments of Written Culture. Some 56 research assistants, including 3 doctors and 31 candidates of sciences, work in the institute.

Abdulgani Mukhamedovich Mirzoyev, member of the TaSSR Academy of Science, doctor of philology and honored figure of science of the Tajik and Uzbek SSR's, who headed first the department and then the institute (1958-1976), devoted his entire scientific activity to a study of the problems of Tajik language and folklore, the

history of Tajik-Persian literature and Tajik literature's relations with the literature of Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and the countries of the Arab East. He exerted much effort for the development of oriental studies in the republic and the training of scientific personnel. More than 300 scientific and scientific-commentary works published in the Soviet Union and abroad came from his pen: "Sayido Nasafi and His Place in the History of Tajik Literature" (Stalinobod, 1947), "Mulham Buhoro'i" (Stalinobod, 1948), "Binoi" (Stalinobod, 1957), "Abu Abdollah Rudaki. Life and Work" (Stalinobod, 1958), "Abu Iskhak" (Dushanbe, 1971) and others made a big contribution to the development of national oriental studies.

The Institute of Oriental Studies is currently headed by Doctor of Philosophy M.S. Asimov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has published more than 300 scientific and scientific-commentary works, including ["Amir Khisraf Dekhlavi"] (Dushanbe, 1975) (in conjunction with A.M. Mirzoyev), "Emergence and Development of Philosophical Thought" (Dushanbe, 1970) and "Science of Central Asia of the Kushan Era and Paths of its Study" (Dushanbe, 1968).

Scientific research in the Institute is conducted in the following main areas: socioeconomic problems of the Asian developing countries; singularities of the historical development of the oriental countries of recent and most recent times; regularities of the development of world literature, primarily the classical literary heritage of Tajik-Persian and Tajik literature of the X-IV centuries, and also Indian literature (Urdu); history of the literary relations of the Central Asian peoples with the peoples of India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan; history of world culture (including publication of critical texts of monuments of the written heritage of the culture of the peoples of Central Asia and contiguous countries); and regularities of the functioning and development of languages (the languages of India and Arabic), primarily the lexicological, grammatical and stylistic problems directly connected with studies in textual criticism.

A basic problem confronting the institute's scholars is the study and publication of the written heritage and the unique and rare manuscripts of the collection of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences in Tajik-Persian, Arabic and Turkic languages; compilation of a catalogue of oriental manuscripts; and others. Together with this, great attention is paid to a further extension of scientific research in the sphere of a comprehensive study of the socioeconomic and political-religious problems of the Near and Middle East countries; a study of the history and languages of the peoples of this region; scientific translations into Russian of monuments of culture; and the mathematical collection and study of Ismailitic manuscripts in the Pamirs.

A significant place in the subject matter being developed in the Iran Sector is occupied by a study of Persian literature of the XIX century, Tajik literature's relations with the literature of Iran and Afghanistan since the XV century and the literature, history and economics of Iran of most recent times and also individual problems of a grammatical-lexical nature in the Persian language.¹ The sector has prepared for publication the work "Iranian Literature of the Start of the First Half of the 'Bozgasht' Period," "Amir Kabir and His Reforms," "The Qasidah and its Traditions in the Work of Malik ash-Shuaro Bakhar," "Iranian Collection" and other works.

The sphere of research of the scholars of the Afghanistan Sector is contemporary Afghan literature in Dari and Pushtu. Works have been prepared on the work of Afghanistan's contemporary writers, and research is being conducted into the genre of the contemporary Afghan short story and also certain questions of the Dari and Pushtu languages, topical problems of the contemporary history and economics of Afghanistan, certain sources on the history of Ismailism, the modernization of Islam and others. A number of monographs and studies in textual criticism has been published.²

In the India and Pakistan Sector great attention is paid to a study of the Persian-language and Urdu-language literature of India and Pakistan of the XII-XVI centuries and the end of the XIX-start of the XX centuries. Work is being performed on bringing to light the creative heritage of little-known Persian-language poets of India of the XIV-XVI centuries. Tajik literature's relations with the literature of India and Pakistan (XVI-XVIII centuries) are being studied, as are certain grammatical phenomena in the Hindi and Urdu languages. The results of the sector's scientific research activity have been set forth in monographs and works of textual criticism.³ The monographs of M. Makhkamov "Afghan-Pakistani Relations in the 1960's-1970's" and Kh. Radzhabov "The Short-Story Writing of the Hindi Literature Writer Mohan Rakesh" have been prepared for publication.

The main field of study of the institute's Arabists is problems of Arab literature of recent and most recent times and Tajik literature's relations with Arab literature (XI-XII centuries). Important historical monuments are being translated into Russian and Tajik. Monographs on Egyptian literature of the first half of the XIX century, the life and work of the Egyptian educator of the XIX century, Rifa'at-Tahtawi, and others have been prepared for publication.⁴

In the Textual Criticism and Publication Section work is being performed in the following fields: compilation and preparation for publication of the creative heritage of great thinkers of that past (Firdausi, Nizami, Jami and others); preparation for publication of Tajik-Persian poetry anthologies; and preparation and publication of the fullest collections of the works of the classical authors of Tajik-Persian literature (Jami, [Amir Khisrafi Dekhlavi], Hafiz, Saadia, Bedil, Saidoya Nasafi and others). With the participation of scholars from other sectors the assistants of the Textual Criticism and Publication Section have prepared for publication and published more than 40 titles of works of textual criticism and monographs in addition to those listed above.⁵ Seven volumes of the 12-volume anthology of Tajik-Persian poetry and prose, five of which have already been published, have been prepared for publication. Work is being performed on the publication of popular scientific texts of selected works of Persian-language authors in modern and Arabic script.

The Scientific Description of Manuscripts and Catalogues Sector is completing a scientific description of Tajik-Persian manuscripts and also the compilation of a catalogue of oriental manuscripts of the collection of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences in 10 volumes. This work is of tremendous scientific and cultural significance. On the basis of the valuable information on the history of the culture of the peoples of Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan and the countries of the Arab East reflected in the catalogue it will be possible to make a comprehensive study of various scientific problems connected with the history, literature,

languages, natural and exact sciences, social thought and art of the peoples of the foreign East. The catalogue will familiarize readers with the very great cultural heritage of the peoples of Ma Wara' an-Nahr and the Near and Middle East.

Work is being performed on the primary processing and scientific description of Arabic and newly acquired Tajik-Persian manuscripts. The manuscript collection of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences, which is housed in the institute and which is the priceless property of the entire Tajik people, is being replenished. The manuscript collection currently has over 6,000 volumes of manuscript, which constitutes approximately 20,00 titles, and more than 5,000 lithographs in Tajik, Persian, Arabic and other languages. The most ancient of them go back to the XIII-XIV centuries. In the number of manuscripts and lithographs and in their significance the manuscript collection of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences occupies a leading place among the Soviet Union's libraries. It serves as the basis for scientific research not only for assistants of the institute but also for many Soviet and foreign orientalists. A building for the collection furnished with the latest national and foreign equipment has been built for the custody of the manuscripts and their better use.

The Department of Socioeconomic and Political-Religious Problems of the Near and Middle East Countries (created in 1980) is developing a number of problems: the current stage of the socioeconomic and political development of the countries of the Near and Middle East; the regular nature of the world-historical process (with reference to the Asian region); and problems of the history of atheism and religion. Recent events in Iran, Afghanistan and other oriental countries have demonstrated the political relevance of a comprehensive scientific study of the evolution of Islam and its social and political role in the modern world. A number of works has been prepared and published on individual aspects of religion and social thought.⁶

The activity of the Tajik center of oriental studies is pursued in close connection with the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies. The subject matter developed in the institute is included in the collated coordination plans of scientific research into the oriental countries which are discussed annually by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies Council to prevent duplication of subject matter and free it of nontopical and inefficient developments. The USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies is rendering Tajikistan great assistance in the training of highly skilled orientalist personnel. More than 50 research and research-pedagogical orientalists have been trained in the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies. Furthermore, the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies is rendering the Tajik orientalists scientific-methods assistance.

The TaSSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies is also working in close contact with other of our country's oriental studies' establishments; the Uzbek Institute of Manuscripts, the Tashkent State University imeni V.I. Lenin, the Leningrad State University imeni A.A. Zhdanov, academic establishments and VUZ's of the republic and others. Plans of scientific activity are exchanged, work meetings of specialists for the development of plans of joint research into individual problems are held, there is cooperation in the publication of written monuments and experience in the sphere of the custody, restoration and catalogization of manuscripts is exchanged.

The institute is rendering the republic's schools and VUZ's great assistance. Thus the institute's scholars deliver lectures on the recent and very recent history of Asian and African countries and conduct special courses on various aspects of oriental studies in the Tajik State University, direct the writing of degree works, act as the opponents and leaders of thesis work and so forth. The students, graduate students and professors and instructors of the university and other of the republic's VUZ's use the material of the manuscript collection and library of the institute in their work and receive the necessary advice on scientific questions.

A form of cooperation with the republic's schools and VUZ's is the institute's active participation in the preparation and publication of textbooks and study aids. For several years now young scholars of the institute have been holding classes on a voluntary basis in the Malaya Academy, which was set up for gifted schoolchildren under the auspices of the city Pioneer Center and TaSSR Academy of Sciences.

The institute maintains scientific relations with 80 foreign research establishments and individual scholars of various countries: Karachi, Lahore, Kabul, Punjab and Minnesota universities, the Iqbal Academy, the Institute for the Study of Central and Western Asia, the ["Khamdard"] National Organization, the Center for the Study of Iran in Rawalpindi, the Institute of Islamic Studies (India) and others. These relations are pursued along the following lines: exchanges of books, participation in scientific conference, reciprocal visits by scholars for research work and general cultural exchange, exchange of scientific information, publication of works by the institute's assistants abroad and the joint publication of historical and literary monuments. Dozens of monographs, works of textual criticism and learned articles of the institute's scholars have been published in foreign countries. The monographs of Academician A.M. Mirzoyev, "Rudaki" (1973) and "Abu Iskhak" (1974), which were published in Iran, have become well known abroad. A number of works with the participation of K.S. Ayni has also been published in Iran: the poems of Hodja Kirmani ["Khumay and Khumayun"] and Gurgani "Vis and Ramin" (1971) and [Zayniddin Vasifi's] work ["Baday-al-vakay"] (1971-1972). D.S. Saidmuradov's study of the facsimile publication of Mahmud al-Husayni's "Tariq-i Ahmad-shahi" was published in Afghanistan in 1974-1975, while A. Afsakhzod's study of the scientific-critical publication of Abd-ur-rahman Jami's poem "Bahoriston" was published in 1975. A. Jami's poem "Salman o-Absal," which was prepared by K.S. Ayni, was published in 1977 in the GDR.

The publication of Tajik orientalists' works abroad is of great significance in the dissemination of Soviet scientific methodology and testifies to the recognition of Tajik literary criticism and the literary heritage of the Tajik people.

A result of the joint research being performed by the orientalists of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies with Pakistani scholars of the Institute of the Study of Central and Western Asia of the University of Karachi was the publication in Pakistan in 1976 of the works of Jahangir ["Tazkirat ush-shuaro"] (prepared by Academician A.M. Mirzoyev, epilogue by the Pakistani scholar Said Hisamuddin Rashidi) and in 1977 of Mutribi Samarkandi's recollections of the Emperor Jahangir "Hatirat-i Mutribi Samarkandi" (prepared by A.M. Mirzoyev, foreword by S.H. Rashidi and introduction by Mahmud Hasan Siddiqi).

The journals and newspapers of Iran, Afghanistan and India publish learned articles of the institute's assistants devoted to various problems of oriental studies. Many of the works of Tajik orientalists are well known by foreign scholars and are frequently used by them in their research.

The institute is the organizer of or participant in scientific conferences: the annual Rudaki scientific conference (held until 1977), a conference devoted to the 700th anniversary of the birth of the famous Persian poet of India, [Amir Khisraf Dekhlavi] (1975), anniversary festivities connected with the 100th anniversary of the birth of Mohamed Iqbal (1977) and the 1,000th anniversary of abu-'al abu-'Ali ibn-Sina. The institute's scholars prepared and published a number of works dedicated to the great scholar-physician in connection with this significant date.⁷ The institute also participates in international scientific conferences, symposia and seminars.

A reexamination and change of the institute's structure and, in this connection, changes in the direction of its scientific research activity are envisaged for the purpose of the further intensification of scientific research. In line with complete staffing with the necessary personnel the area studies nature of the scientific research will give way to scientific research conducted in definite scientific areas such as the history, economics, languages, literature and social thought of the countries of the foreign East.

FOOTNOTES

1. A.M. Mirzoyev, "Abu Iskhak," Dushanbe, 1971 (in Tajik); M. Mulloakhmedov, "Faruhii Siistani," Dushanbe, 1978 (in Tajik); Z. Akhrorov, "Mushfiki," Dushanbe, 1978; A.M. Mirzoyev, "Sezdakh makala. Collection of Articles," Dushanbe, 1977; Yedbudi Rudaki, Collection of Articles, Dushanbe, 1978; Hodja Kirmani, "Khumay and Khuamayum" (Text of the poem published in Iran by K.S. Ayni), Tehran, 1971 (in Tajik and Persian); Gurgani, "Vis and Ramin (critical text of poem published in Iran), Tehran, 1971 (in Tajik and Persian) (K.S. Ayni and orientalists of the Georgian SSR participated in the preparation of this text for publication); [Zayniddin Vasifi], ["Badai-al-vaka-yi"], vols 1-2, Tehran, 1971-1972 (in Tajik and Persian) (K.S. Ayni and orientalists of the Leningrad State University imeni A.A. Zhdanov participated in the preparation of the critical text); and others.
2. Sh. Zaripov, "Agricultural Production Forces of Present-Day Afghanistan," Dushanbe, 1972; Mahmud al-Husayni, "Tariq-i Ahmad-shahi" (Introduction, annotated table of contents, chronology and index by D. Saidmuradov), Moscow, 1974 (text in Tajik and Persian); A.M. Mirzoyev, "Binai," Moscow, 1976 (in Tajik); Sh. Aripov, "Series of Works of [Abdurrauf Benava], 'Sorrowful Reflections'," Dushanbe, 1977; U. Obidov, "'Jabal us-Siraj' Dialect (Northern Afghanistan)," Dushanbe, 1977 (in Tajik); M. Gul'dzhanov, U. Obidov, "Concise Technical-Economic Terminological Dari-Russian Dictionary," Dushanbe, 1979; S. Shokhumorov, "'Akkham-i Khuzur' as a Source on the History of Afghanistan of the Start of the XX Century," Moscow, 1980; and others.
3. A. Gaffarov, "The Life and Work of Mirza Asadulla Galib," Dushanbe, 1965 (in Tajik); Sh. Pulatova, "Galib's Letters," Dushanbe, 1966 (in Tajik), M. Bakoyev, "The Life and Work of [Amir Khisraf Dekhlavi]," Dushanbe, 1975 (in Tajik);

- A. Caffarov, "Persian-Language Poetry of India and Pakistan in the Latter Half of the XIX-Start of the XX Centuries," Dushanbe, 1975 (in Tajik); *ibid.*, "Mohamed Iqbal," Dushanbe, 1977 (in Tajik); "Selected Works of [A.K. Dekhlavi]", I-IV, Dushanbe, 1971-1975 (in Tajik); A. Alimardonov, "Ziyouddin Nakhshabi and His 'Tutiname'," Dushanbe, 1980 (in Tajik); S. Makkhamova, "The Women's Movement in Pakistan," Moscow, 1978; Said Abdulsahid, "Mohamed Iqbal," translated into Russian by M. Shahidi, Dushanbe, 1978; A.R. Usmanov, "Questions of the Syntactical Classification of Urdu Verbs," Moscow, 1980; and others.
4. V.P. Demidchik, "Sudanese Poetry of the XX-Century," Dushanbe, 1972, M. Huseyn-zade, "The Fellahin in Egyptian Literature," Dushanbe, 1973; S. Shukroyeva, "The Eschatological Part of Abul-ala-al-Maari's 'Messages of Farewell'," Dushanbe, 1976; "Land of Good and Light. Collection of Poems of Arab Poets," compiled by N. Kakharov and T. Mardonov, Dushanbe, 1980.
 5. See, *inter alia*, the works of A. Jami "Layli and Majnun," "Bahoriston" (prepared by A. Afsakhzod), Dushanbe, 1972 (in Tajik and Arabic) and "Fotihat ush-shubob" (scientific-critical text prepared by A. Afsakhzod), Moscow, 1978; Mukhtaram's ["Tazkirat ush shuaro"], Dushanbe, 1976 (in Tajik and Arabic); ["Nashtari ishk"] (prepared by A. Dzhonfido) (in print); "90 Years of [Bakhrom Sirus]", collection of articles, Dushanbe, 1978 (in Tajik and Russian); Yedbudi Rudaki, Collection of Articles, Dushanbe, 1978 (in Tajik); A. Afsakhzod, "Abd-ur-rahman Jami," Dushanbe, 1978 (in Tajik).
 6. Five philosophical treatises on the theme "Afak va anfus" (on the correlations of man and universe), Moscow, 1970; D.S. Saidmuradov, "The State and Prospects of the Study of Islam in the Tajik Academy of Sciences," "Islam and its Role in the Present-day Ideological-Political Struggle of Asian and African Developing Countries," Moscow-Tashkent, 1980; [Silki gukharez] (source on the history of Ismailism); M. Gul'dzhanov, "Evolution of Islam in Afghanistan" (in print).
 7. A. Alimardonov and D. Dodalishoyev, "Tales of Avicenna," Dushanbe, 1980 (in Tajik); K.S. Ayni, Sh. Huseyn-zade and Kh. Sharipov, ["Avdzhi Zukhal"] (Collection of Poems of ibn-Sina), Dushanbe, 1980 (in Tajik); abu-'Ali ibn-Sina, "Tatamat un-nadzhat," translated from the Arabic into Tajik by [Kh. Tarbiyat], foreward by M.S. Asimov and K.S. Ayni, edited by I. Khodzhiyev, Dushanbe, 1980; and others.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury", 1981

8850

CSO: 1830/152

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

Feb 4, 1982